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Surging Intercountry Adopt ions in Africa: 
Paltry Domestication of International Standards 
Joseph M. Isanga* 
Abstract 
This Article is dedicated to addressing the issues surrounding intercoun-
try adoption, specifically in regards to Africa. In light of the dramatic in-
crease in the number of intercountry adoptions from Africa, it has become 
imperative to take a critical look at  the arguments for and against inter-
country adoptions, the existing framework for this practice, and the juris-
prudence and legislation of select African countries in this area. Through 
expounding on the aforementioned topics, this Article showcases the need for 
improved regulation. It then presents recommendations for how this system 
can be improved to further facilitate intercountry adoptions, a vital step for 
finding stable homes for orphans. 
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I. Introduction 
Immigrant adoptive children used to be almost exclusively Euro-
pean in origin, at least with regard to those adopted by Americans.1 
Then the trend shifted toward adopting Asian and Latin American 
children.2 More recently, the trend has turned dramatically toward 
adopting children from Africa.3 In 2003, intercountry adoptions from 
Africa accounted for only 5% of the worldwide total, but this figure 
rose to 22% in 2009.4 In the past eight years, international adoptions 
from Africa have increased by a mind-boggling 400%.5 In 2010, 
Ethiopia was ranked as the second most sending country in the world 
after China,6 although its population is substantially less than that of 
China.7 In 2008, out of 17,438 adoptions from abroad, 2399 visas 
were issued to African-born children adopted by Americans.8 It is 
now acknowledged that “Africa has become the new frontier for in-
tercountry adoption.”9 Simultaneously, intercountry adoptions from 
other regions have consistently trended downward since 2004.10 
 
 1. Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 23 Tulsa L.J. 317, 318 
(1988). Many prospective adoptive parents from the United States turned to international 
adoption in part to avoid the greater risk of pre- and post-adoption interference from birth par-
ents in local adoptions. Elena Schwieger, Getting to Stay: Clarifying Legal Treatment of Improper 
Adoptions, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 825, 826–27 (2011). 
 2. Carlson, supra note 1, at 318. 
 3. Out of Ethiopia: Is International Adoption an Ethical Business?, BBC News (June 25, 
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18506474 [hereinafter Out of Ethiopia] (report-
ing that Ethiopia alone “accounts for almost one in five international adoptions in the US” and 
that, since 1999, 11,524 Ethiopian children have been adopted by American families, with 
Angelina Jolie probably the most famous person to adopt from Ethiopia). 
 4. Peter Selman, Intercountry Adoption: Trends and Perspectives, Afr. Child Pol’y F. 
(May 29, 2012), https://www.box.com/s/0b88aef0194db21b58b0/1/293515832/2324729458/1. 
 5. Adoption from Africa: Concern Over ‘Dramatic Rise,’ BBC News (June 25, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18248007 [hereinafter Adoption from Africa]. 
 6. Intercountry adoptions from Ethiopia to the United States were 2513 in 2010, 
whereas from China they were 3401. Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
FY 2010 Annual Report on Intercountry Adoptions 3 (2010), available at http://adoption 
.state.gov/content/pdf/fy2010_annual_report.pdf. 
 7. Ethiopia is one of the “new preferred countries for adoption, partially because of its 
relatively cheap adoption cost of $20,000, which is affordable compared to the prices from oth-
er nations.” Rachel J. Wechsler, Giving Every Child a Chance: The Need for Reform and Infrastruc-
ture in Intercountry Adoption Policy, 22 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 1, 30 (2010). 
 8. Eyes on Adoption: More Orphans Coming from African Countries, Chi. Trib, Apr. 2, 
2009, at 3. 
 9. Intercountry adoptions with African countries as the sending states from 2000 to 
2010 were as follows: 2000 (33,068); 2001 (36,391); 2002 (38,530); 2003 (41,540); 2004 
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The adoption trends in Africa have not been correspondingly 
marked by a domestication of international adoption standards. In-
terestingly, as non-African countries11 such as China, Russia,12 South 
Korea, and the Ukraine have tightened regulations13 under which in-
tercountry adoptions may take place,14 adoptions in those countries 
have increased, while adoptions in the United States have declined.15 
Therefore, prospective Western adoptive parents have increasingly 
 
(45,298); 2005 (43,710); 2006 (39,460); 2007 (37,249); 2008 (34,785); 2009 (29,867); and 2010 
(29,095). See African Child Policy Forum, Africa: The New Frontier for Intercoun-
try Adoption 1, chart 1 (2012) [hereinafter African Child Policy Forum], available at 
http://www.africanchildforum.org/ipc/documents/Africa%20-%20The%20New% 
20Frontier%20for%20Intercountry%20Adoption-EN.pdf. 
 10. Richard Carlson, Seeking the Better Interests of Children with a New International Law of 
Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 733, 734 (2011). 
 11. In 2011 there were 9320 intercountry adoptions in the United States, 2589 of which 
were from China. But U.S. intercountry adoptions from Africa were 2549, almost equaling 
those of China. Fiscal Year 2011 Annual Report, U.S. Dep’t of State: Bureau of Consular 
Affairs, 3 (Nov. 16, 2011), http://adoption.state.gov/content/pdf/fy2011_annual_report.pdf. 
In 2007, China enacted regulations disqualifying foreign adoption applicants who were single, 
overweight, over the age of fifty, or recently divorced. Calum MacLeod, Foreign Adoptions from 
China Fall: More Chinese Adopting; Fewer Children Available, USA Today, Nov. 21, 2007, at 1A; 
see also The Adoption Morass, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 13, 2007, at C8, cited in 
Wechsler, supra note 7, at 3 (“In 2007, China enacted regulations disqualifying foreign adop-
tion applicants who were single, overweight, over the age of fifty, or recently divorced.”). 
 12. In Russia, 30% of children are designated as orphans, which is four to five times 
higher than the percentage of orphans in Europe or the United States. Clifford J. Levy, Russian 
Orphanage Offers Love, but Not Families, N.Y. Times (May 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/05/04/world/europe/04adopt.html (“Most of them are children who have either been giv-
en up by their parents or removed from dysfunctional homes by the authorities.”). In 2008, 
13,000 children were officially adopted from Russia, including 9000 by Russians and 4000 by 
foreigners. Id. 
 13. It is observed that the international community “harbors major concerns regarding 
the cultural displacement that seemingly occurs as part of the intercountry adoption process.” 
George Waddington, A New Class of Persons: Intercountry Adoptees and Postcolonial Theories of Cul-
tural Hybridity, 1 Creighton Int’l & Comp. L.J. 81, 84 (2011). 
 14. International Adoptions in Decline, Time, http://www.time.com/time/interactive/ 
0,31813,1893321,00.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) (observing that with stricter requirements 
for prospective parents and tighter laws to crack down on illegal practices, international adop-
tions to the United States have fallen over 20% in the past five years, with some countries de-
clining by nearly half). 
 15. In 2004 there were 22,990 total intercountry adoptions. Elizabeth Bartholet, Interna-
tional Adoption: A Way Forward, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 687, 688–89 (2011). In 2010 there 
were only 11,059 such adoptions in the United States, “which is responsible for roughly half of 
the world’s total number of international adoptions.” Id. Therefore, the number of internation-
al adoptions “has fallen by more than half in the last six years, after steadily rising during the 
prior six decades.” Id. at 688. 
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looked to adopt from African countries, where less-strict regulations 
exist,16 yet intercountry adoptions have dramatically increased.17 
Nonetheless, African countries remain apprehensive about the suita-
bility of intercountry adoptions.  
Even if African states are not explicitly acting on its basis, the sto-
ry of Torry Hansen’s ill-fated adoption serves to illustrate the reason 
for such African fears.18 Torry Hansen, of Tennessee, sent her 
adopted son, seven-year-old Artyom Savelyev, back to his native Rus-
sia.19 She arranged for him to fly to Moscow by himself, arriving with 
a note from Hansen stating, “I no longer wish to parent this child.”20 
She was giving him up, the note explained, because he was “mentally 
unstable.”21 This extreme case of an American mother returning her 
adoptive child as if he was an unsatisfactory purchase22 focused in-
tense attention on the pitfalls of international adoption.23 This case 
ultimately found resolution in a U.S. court.24 
 
 16. See, e.g., Kayla Webley, Why Americans Are Adopting Fewer Kids from China, 
Time (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1902824,00.html 
(observing that when forty-four-year-old Texan Becky Freer decided to adopt a child from 
China she found out that, because she was a single woman, she was ineligible under China’s 
new laws, enacted in May 2007). 
 17. Eyes on Adoption: More Orphans Coming from African Countries, supra note 8. 
 18. See Kate Pickert, Russian Adoption: What Happens When a Parent Gives Up?, Time 
(Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1982326,00.html. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. Perhaps Hansen should not have gone as far as she did. That said, however, 
[a]doptive parents [are] overwhelmed by behaviors that in extreme cases can include 
violence, hoarding, suicidal tendencies, catatonia, inappropriate sexual behavior and 
pyromania. These behaviors are not the norm, but they have been reported in hun-
dreds if not thousands of international adoptions. 
Kate Pickert, Russian Kids in America: When the Adopted Can’t Adapt, Time (June 28, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1997439,00.html. 
 22. See Clifford J. Levy, Russia Calls for Halt on U.S. Adoptions, N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/world/europe/10russia.html. Hansen wrote, “After 
giving my best to this child, I am sorry to say that for the safety of my family, friends and my-
self, I no longer wish to parent this child.” Id. The situation prompted the Russian government 
to threaten suspending all American adoptions of Russian children until preventative measures 
could be created. Id. 
 23. Levy, supra note 12. 
 24. Thankfully, this case ended on a happy note. Tennessee Circuit Judge F. Lee Russell 
ruled that Torry Hansen was responsible for child support payments to her adopted son total-
ing $58,240 in arrears (the entire cost of Artem’s institutional and medical care since his return 
to Russia) and $1000 per month in child-support payments until he turns eighteen or is once 
again adopted. See Hansen v. Hansen, No. 12062 (17th Jud. Dist. Tenn. May 17, 2012), 
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Yet while intercountry adoptions remain controversial, many Af-
rican countries have overly restrictive regulations, and the great ma-
jority of them are either unwilling or unable to join international 
treaties that could provide an additional layer of regulation and su-
pervision. The current regulations are ineffective while also being 
overly restrictive; the adoption of new regulations would be a more 
effective approach. Additionally, prospective adoptive parents may 
feel more comfortable adopting from countries with clearer legal 
frameworks. In light of the dramatic increase in the number of inter-
country adoptions from Africa,25 it is imperative to take a critical look 
at the regulatory framework relative to intercountry adoptions from 
that continent. A hard look reveals that a vast number of African 
countries have elementary or overly restrictive regulation of inter-
country adoption.26 Additionally, many African countries continue to 
struggle with internal law enforcement and the rule of law, resulting 
in judicial decisions that flout international standards regarding inter-
country adoptions.27 If domestic regulations were brought into con-
formity with international regulations on intercountry adoptions, 
there would be a better regime on this issue. The United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) has on several oc-
casions remarked that African countries need to develop their legal 
framework regarding intercountry adoption.28 The UNCRC noted 
that even in the few cases where a legal structure exists, informal 
adoptions still occur.29 
 
http://www.reformtalk.net/wp-content/upLoads/2012/05/Hansen.pdf. 
 25. Adoption from Africa, supra note 5. 
 26. See, e.g., Mohammed Adow, Ethiopia’s Adoption Dilemma, BBC News (Oct. 6, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4312722.stm (“The process of adopting children from Ethio-
pia is much simpler than the process in countries like China.” For example, prospective adop-
tive parents are only required to stay in the country for two weeks “to learn something about 
Ethiopia.”). 
 27. African Child Policy Forum, supra note 9. 
 28. For example, in its remarks regarding Cameroon in 2001, the UNCRC expressed 
concern regarding the lack of a “legislative structure for the protection of the best interests of 
the child in cases of intercountry adoption,” a “large number of children being sold by their 
parents,” and the “possible use of intercountry adoption for the purpose of trafficking.” Comm. 
on the Rights of the Child, Rep. on the 28th Sess., Sept. 24–Oct. 12, 2001, at 79, 85, 86, U.N. 
Doc. CRC/C/111 (Nov. 28, 2001). 
 29. For example, the UNCRC expressed concern in respect to Gambia that while the 
1992 Adoption Act “provides for the regulation of adoptions (domestic and intercountry) . . . 
informal adoptions, which are generally not monitored with respect to the best interests of the 
child, are more widely accepted and practised.” Id. at 95 ¶ 436. With regard to Guinea-Bissau, 
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Africa has many worthy cases of adoptable children. This is as a 
result of Africa having had more than its fair share of tragedies, nota-
bly numerous conflicts generating many refugee children, the 
HIV/AIDS30 pandemic, which left multitudes orphaned,31 as well as 
 
the UNCRC noted that “[t]he common use of ‘informal adoption’ procedures can lead to the 
violation of children’s rights.” Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Rep. on the 30th Sess., May 
21–June 7, 2002, at 20, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/118 (Sept. 3, 2002). Concerning Burkina Faso, the 
UNCRC said it was “concerned at the very little interest in formal adoption in the State party, 
which may lead to the practices of confiage and customary adoption and to an increase in inter-
country adoptions with no adequate monitoring mechanism.” Comm. on the Rights of the 
Child, Rep. on the 31st Sess., Sept. 16–Oct. 4, 2002, at 111, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/121 (Dec. 11, 
2002). With regard to Zambia, the UNCRC noted, “the Adoption Act of 1958 provides for the 
regulation of domestic and intercountry adoptions, but remains concerned that informal adop-
tions, which are generally not monitored with respect to the best interests and other rights of 
the child, are more widely accepted and practiced within the State party.” Comm. on the Rights 
of the Child, Rep. on the 33d Sess., May 19–June 6, 2003, at 39, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/132 (Oct. 
23, 2003). Pertaining to Madagascar, the UNCRC noted, “various types of informal adoption 
such as ‘godparenting’ that are not conducive to full respect for children’s rights.” Comm. on 
the Rights of the Child, Rep. on the 34th Sess., Sept. 15–Oct. 3, 2003, at 64, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/133 (Jan. 14, 2004). The UNCRC was also “concerned that intercountry adoptions are 
not properly followed up.” Id. In reference to Liberia, the UNCRC was concerned about “the 
lack of interest in domestic adoption in the State party and . . . the widespread use of informal 
adoption practices that are not conducive to full respect for children’s rights. The Committee is 
further concerned that there are no arrangements to regulate and monitor intercountry adop-
tions.” Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Rep. on the 36th Sess., May 17–June 4, 2004, at 73, 
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/140 (Sept. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Rep. on the 36th Sess.]. With regard to 
Botswana, the UNCRC recommended a “review of the Adoption Act in order to bring existing 
rules and practices regulating adoption into full compliance with the Convention to ensure that 
in cases of informal adoption, the rights of the child are well protected to encourage formal 
domestic adoptions.” Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Rep. on the 37th Sess., Sep. 13–Oct. 
1, 2004, at 31, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/121 (Jan. 12, 2004). Pertaining to Togo, the UNCRC was 
concerned “about the vague adoption procedures, the occurrence of informal adoption and the 
absence of mechanisms to review, monitor and follow up adoption, especially intercountry 
adoption.” Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Rep. on the 38th Sess., Jan. 10–Nov. 28, 2005, at 
111, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/146 (July 19, 2005). 
 30. According to UNICEF, by 2010 an estimated 15.7 million children—30% of the 53 
million anticipated orphans from all causes in Sub-Saharan Africa—had lost at least one parent 
due to AIDS. Africa’s Orphaned and Vulnerable Generations: Children Affected by Aids, UNAIDS, 
UNICEF & PEPFAR, http://www.unicef.org/publications/index_35645.html (last visited Feb. 
2, 2013). 
 31. Fifty-million children in Sub-Saharan Africa are orphans, according to UNICEF. 50 
Million African Orphans Have to Fend for Themselves, United Nations Radio (June 16, 2011), 
http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2011/06/50-million-african-orphans-have-to-fend 
-for-themselves. But UNICEF defines an orphan as a child who has lost at least one parent to 
death, making those figures potentially over-inclusive. Trish Maskew & Johanna Oreskovic, Red 
Thread or Slender Reed: Deconstructing Prof. Bartholet’s Mythology of International Adoption, 14 
Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 71, 79 (2008). 
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most of Africa’s population existing in biting poverty.32 Africa also 
has the highest number of children living in especially difficult cir-
cumstances.33 In such situations, substitute homes become compel-
ling.34 In the more developed countries, the number of babies sur-
rendered or abandoned by birth parents has been limited by 
contraception, abortion, and the increased tendency of single parents 
to keep their children. Therefore, there are very few children availa-
ble for adoption in comparison with the large number of people who, 
for infertility and other reasons, are eager to adopt.35 “In the poorer 
countries of the world, war, political turmoil, and economic circum-
stances contribute to a situation in which there are very few prospec-
tive adopters in comparison with the vast number of children in need 
of homes.”36 
As more media attention has focused on the plight of African 
children, intercountry adoption37 has often been understood as the 
 
 32. Fifth International Policy Conference on the African Child, Draft Guidelines for 
Action on Intercountry Adoption of Children in Africa 7 (May 29–30, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript) [hereinafter Draft Guidelines], available at http://www.africanchildforum.org/ipc/ 
documents/Draft%20ICA%20Guidelines%20ACPF.pdf (providing that intercountry adoption 
should not be considered “where poverty, however defined, seems to be the sole reason why the 
child cannot grow up in his or her biological (including extended) family environment”). 
 33. See, UNICEF, State of the World’s Children 2012 (2012), at 133, http://www. 
unicef.org/sowc/files/SOWC_2012-Main_Report_EN_21Dec2011.pdf (illustrating that Afri-
can countries top the list in mortality rates: 3.8 million children under-five in 2010). World-
wide, “1 in 3 urban dwellers lives in slum conditions; in Africa, the proportion is a staggering 6 
in 10.” Id. at v. 
 34. What is concerning is that “[a]s international adoptions have flourished, so has evi-
dence that babies in many countries are being systematically bought, coerced, and stolen away 
from their birth families. . . . And yet when a country is closed due to corruption, many adop-
tion agencies simply transfer their clients’ hopes to the next ‘hot’ country.” E.J. Graff, The Lie 
We Love, Foreign Pol’y Mag., 60 (Nov. 1, 2008), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2008/10/15/the_lie_we_love. Graff writes that 
[i]n many countries, it can be astonishingly easy to fabricate a history for a young 
child, and in the process, manufacture an orphan. The birth mothers are often poor, 
young, unmarried, divorced, or otherwise lacking family protection . . . for enough 
money, someone will separate these little ones from their vulnerable families, turning 
them into “paper orphans” for lucrative export. 
 Id. at 63. 
 35. Waddington, supra note 13, at 83. 
 36. Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety, Prospects, and Pragmatics, 13 J. 
Am. Acad. Matrim. Law 181, 182 (1996). 
 37. Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African 
Child Today: Progress or Problems?, 25 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 37, 40 (2010). 
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way to deliver these children from destitute lives.38 Nevertheless, it 
must be stressed that 
[a] demand-driven intercountry adoption system built upon the 
vulnerability of parents living in extreme poverty therefore under-
cuts, rather than facilitates, human rights. It is one thing to inter-
vene to mitigate the negative impacts of poverty, but something else 
entirely to take advantage of the vulnerability of the poor to obtain 
their children.39 
Accordingly, it has been noted that countries in which significant 
international adoption abuses have been alleged and documented of-
ten suffer from conditions referred to above, such as extreme pov-
erty.40 
African nations are suspicious of intercountry adoption as a solu-
tion to the problem of institutionalization and the raising of adopta-
ble children in poverty.41 In terms of abuses, the recently released 
2012 U.S. Trafficking in Persons report indicated that “[b]y region, 
the Asia and the Pacific region (which includes South Asia) remains 
largest in terms of number of victims, though the estimate of traffick-
ing victims in Africa has grown since the 2005 estimate.”42 In re-
 
 38. Benyam Dawit Mezmur, Intercountry Adoption as a Measure of Last Resort in Africa: 
Advancing the Rights of a Child Rather than a Right to a Child, 10 SUR Int’l J. Hum. Rts. 82, 83 
(2009). 
 39. David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption and Poverty: A Human Rights Analysis, 36 Cap. 
U. L. Rev. 413, 453 (2007). 
 40. Maskew & Oreskovic, supra note 31, at 106. 
 41. It has been observed that “several scandalous reports of abuse and fraud [exist] 
throughout the adoption process in several countries, which may have an impact on the decline 
in international adoptions.” Adoption News Stories of 2011, Adoption Star, http://www.adopt 
ionstar.com/tag/decline-in-international-adoptions (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
 42. Trafficking in Persons Report 2012, U.S. Dep’t St., http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tipr 
pt/2012/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013). There has been a steady increase in intercountry 
adoptions from Africa to the United States: 171 in 1998, 200 in 1999, 217 in 2000, 343 in 2001, 
337 in 2002, 417 in 2003, and 580 in 580. Adoption Factbook IV, at 43 (Thomas C. Atwood 
et al. eds., 2007), available at https://www.adoptioncouncil.org/publications/adopt ion-
factbook.html. By 2008, there were 1277 intercountry adoptions from Africa to the United 
States. U.S. Dep’t of State, Annual Report on Intercountry Adoptions 17–18 (2009), 
available at http://adoption.state.gov/content/pdf/Adoption_Report_v9_SM.pdf. There were 
2765 intercountry adoptions from Africa to the United States in 2009. U.S. Dep’t of State, 
2009 Annual Report on Intercountry Adoptions 16–17 (2009), available at 
http://adoption.state.gov/content/pdf/fy2009_annual_report.pdf. There were 3138 intercoun-
try adoptions from Africa to the United States in 2010. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2010 Annual 
Report on Intercountry Adoptions 3–5 (2010), available at http://1.usa.gov/VStDoc. 
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sponse, some African nations have emphasized institutionalization as 
the preferred option.43 Yet institutionalization can have drastic con-
sequences on a child, including reactive attachment disorder, “a con-
dition that impairs their ability to get along smoothly in society and 
to relate warmly to friends.”44 It is important to note that when 
properly regulated45 and executed, intercountry adoption can provide 
the only appropriate alternative to institutionalization in circumstanc-
es where in-country adoption is not feasible.46 If it is not possible to 
place adoptable children in-country,47 then intercountry adoption 
should be warmly embraced as an option.48 For this reason, outright 
prohibition of intercountry adoption has few adherents in the inter-
national community;49 most favor some adoption as long as it is 
properly regulated50 without being overly restricting.51 
 
 43. See Barbara Stark, Lost Boys and Forgotten Girls: Intercountry Adoption, Human Rights, 
and African Children, 22 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 275, 280 (2003). 
 44. Anthony D’Amato, Cross-Country Adoption: A Call to Action, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1239, 1241 (May 1998). 
 45. Some would argue that, as long as money is involved, intercountry adoption will 
never be a viable option. Jena Martin, The Good, the Bad & the Ugly? A New Way of Looking at the 
Intercountry Adoption Debate, 13 U. C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 173, 189 (2007). 
 46. Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human Rights Prin-
ciples: Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child with the Hague Conven-
tion on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. Int’l L.J. 179, 219 (2003). See also D. Marianne Blair, 
Safeguarding the Interests of Children in Intercountry Adoption: Assessing the Gatekeepers, 34 Cap. U. 
L. Rev. 349 (2006). 
 47. Some scholars argue that it is a false assumption that “blacks generally do not adopt.” 
Tshepo L. Mosikatsana, Examining Class and Racial Bias in the Adoption Process and the Viability of 
Transracial Adoptions as a Policy Preference: A Further Reply to Professors Joubert, Pakati and Zaal, 
13 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 602, 603 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Scholars also 
argue against “the culturally hegemonic assumption that only black and coloured children 
should be adopted transracially.” Id. at 605. Mosikatsana argues that 
[t]he assumption that blacks are not informed about adoption and that adoption is al-
ien to the African culture is not borne out by experience. . . . Black families have al-
ways adopted the children of relatives. Most adoptions in the black communities 
tend to be informal and are, as a result, not recorded. This has created the incorrect 
impression that blacks generally do not adopt. 
Id. at 609. 
 48. See Tshepo L. Mosikatsana, Country Adoptions: Is There a Need for New Provisions in 
the Child Care Act?, 16 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 46, 63 (2000). 
 49. Blair, supra note 46, at 352. 
 50. Some critics of this approach maintain that focusing on the bad things that can hap-
pen, and providing adequate regulation in response, tends to “restrict rather than to facilitate 
international adoption.” Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: The Child’s Story, 24 Ga. 
St. U. L. Rev. 333, 339 (2008). There is a need for a balanced and facilitative approach. 
 51. It has been observed that international adoption laws are already restrictive enough. 
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Admittedly, ridding intercountry adoptions of abuses remains a 
huge challenge. Reports are rife of instances of “child-buying, coer-
cion of vulnerable birth parents, weak regulatory structures, and 
profiteering,” as well as a highly problematic fee structure.52 Human-
itarianism can also mask abuse.53 There have been instances of Afri-
can children who were fraudulently taken out of Africa under the 
guise of humanitarianism, but even with the drawbacks of intercoun-
try adoptions, institutionalization is still worse.54 
However, emphasizing the abuses rather than the benefits of in-
tercountry adoption amounts to scapegoating for lack of effort on the 
regulatory plane. The propriety and integrity of adoption should be 
the ultimate guide in all legislative efforts.55 Enforcement and rule-of 
-law challenges will not be overcome overnight in Africa. But it is 
important to know what those are and to examine what needs to be 
 
Elizabeth Bartholet thus observed: 
international adoption provided homes for roughly 40,000 children annually, includ-
ing more than 20,000 homes in the United States. This occurred despite the severe 
restrictions on such adoption that have always existed. The world could easily multi-
ply that number by 10, 100, or more by reducing those restrictions and by develop-
ing facilitative regulation. 
Elizabeth Bartholet, Permanency Is Not Enough: Children Need the Nurturing Parents Found in 
International Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 781, 782 (2011). 
 52. Maskew & Oreskovic, supra note 31, at 76. Authors Maskew and Oreskovic observe 
that fees are highly problematic: 
The country fees are paid to an agency’s facilitators or by the agency to government 
authorities in the sending country. There is no requirement that agencies itemize ei-
ther the country fee or any other “service” fees it charges . . . . The prospect of earn-
ing large amounts of money, none of which needs to be accounted for, on what 
amounts to a contingency fee basis, creates significant incentives for individuals, par-
ticularly in desperately poor countries, to obtain children by any means possible. 
This creates a profound absence of transparency at the most critical level of the 
adoption process, making it virtually impossible to determine how a child came into 
care and whether the process was free of coercion, deception, or payments to induce 
relinquishment. 
Id. at 87–88. 
 53. Dillon, supra note 46, at 186. 
 54. D’Amato, supra note 44, at 1240–41 (citing a TV show, a New York Times report, and 
a Washington Post report that documented the abuses associated with institutionalization). 
 55. See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction, Dignitas Personae, at 
para. 13 (Dec. 8, 2008), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/ 
documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20081208_dignitas-personae_en.html (“[A]doption should be 
encouraged, promoted and facilitated by appropriate legislation so that the many children who 
lack parents may receive a home that will contribute to their human development.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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done from a perspective of regulatory frameworks. Even if “adoption 
laws cannot independently prevent abuses, a sound legal framework is 
fundamental in establishing child-centered standards for intercountry 
adoption.”56 If the status quo does not change, African countries 
could go the way of some countries in Eastern Europe and complete-
ly ban or suspend intercountry adoptions, and some have done exact-
ly that.57 
But a total ban or suspension of intercountry adoptions amounts 
to an abdication that would negatively impact the best interests of 
otherwise adoptable children. This Article is dedicated to highlight-
ing the needs in Africa generally, and more specifically in select Afri-
can countries that exemplify the magnitude of the problem. Because 
of the continuing controversial nature of this topic, Part I presents 
the arguments in favor of intercountry adoption and corresponding 
counterarguments to provide a foundational justification for African 
countries to be engaged. Part II presents the existing international 
framework that African countries could emulate as they try to im-
prove their regulation. Part III analyzes the jurisprudence and legisla-
tion of select African countries to showcase the need for improved 
regulation. Part IV presents relevant recommendations. 
II. Pros and Cons of African Intercountry Adoptions 
A. Arguments Against African Intercountry Adoption 
One of the arguments against intercountry adoptions, and one 
that has particular resonance with many African countries, is that an 
adopted child’s cultural identity could be lost. Opponents of inter-
country adoption maintain that “a child’s cultural identity trumps his 
or her need for a family, and that placing a child in a non-traditional 
 
 56. Mosikatsana, supra note 48, at 52. 
 57. A case in point is Togo. “[I]n February 2008, Togo suspended intercountry adoption 
as a result of detected illegal adoptions.” African Child Policy Forum, supra note 9, at 5. But 
after the adoption of Decree No. 2008-103/PR of July 29, 2008, and Regulation No. 
004/2008/MASPFPEPA of October 24, 2008, which regulated the functions and membership 
of the National Adoption Committee, the government lifted the ban on intercountry adoption. 
Id. “In Liberia, following a number of illegal adoptions, the [p]resident suspended intercountry 
adoptions in 2008 and established a [c]ommission to conduct a comprehensive assessment of 
the laws, policies, and practices of intercountry adoption . . . .” Id. “In June 2007, Lesotho also 
suspended intercountry adoptions in order to address loopholes in the law, policy[,] and prac-
tice pertaining to intercountry adoptions.” Id. 
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family structure may be more important than the traditional para-
digm of the nuclear family that informs intercountry adoption.”58 
The traditional African proverb, “it takes a village to raise a child,” 
models this view of family structure and it has significant implications 
for intercountry adoption concerning “when a child may legally be 
deemed an orphan.”59 “Children’s right to preservation of their cul-
tural background has been used as an argument not only to legitimize 
the privileging of in-country over intercountry adoption, but also as 
an argument against transracial in-country adoption.”60  The Evan B. 
Donaldson Adoption Institute argues, “[R]ace should be a factor in 
adoption placement, and … agencies should be allowed to screen 
non-black families who want to adopt black children—for their abil-
ity to teach self-esteem and defense against racism, and for their level 
of interaction with other black people.”61 The Supreme Court of In-
dia62 and the Hague Convention63 appear to have some points of 
agreement. 
Race should be a factor even in the case of orphans. What is 
wrong, opponents argue, is to equate orphans64 with adoptable chil-
dren, because the statistics on orphans include single orphans (with 
one deceased parent) and double orphans (both parents deceased) in 
the care of extended families.65 “At least four out of five children in 
 
 58. Martin, supra note 45, at 195–96. 
 59. Id. at 197. 
 60. Shruti Johansson & Judith Lind, Preservation of the Child’s Background in In- and In-
tercountry Adoption, 17 Int’l J. Child. Rts. 235, 236 (2009). 
 61. Jeninne Lee-St. John, Should Race Be a Factor in Adoptions?, Time (May 27, 2008), 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1809722,00.html (construing Susan Smith, 
et al., Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, Finding Families for African Ameri-
can Children: The Role of Race & Law in Adoption from Foster Care (2008)). 
 62. See Laxmi Kant Pande v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 469, cited in Stacy I. 
Strong, Children’s Rights in Intercountry Adoption: Towards a New Goal, 13 B.U. Int’l L.J. 163, 
172–73 (1995)) (requiring foreign prospective parents “to be sponsored by a government-
recognized agency that provides pre-adoption screening and ongoing supervision until the 
adoption is complete”). 
 63. See Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect 
of Inter-country Adoption, arts. 5, 9, 21, May 29, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105–51 (1998), re-
printed in 32 I.L.M. 1134 (1993) [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
 64. Out of five million orphans in Ethiopia today, nearly half are orphaned due to 
HIV/AIDS. Some of the children were abandoned, “found by police patrols in dark alleys, and 
at times even in toilets.” See Adow, supra note 26. 
 65. African Child Policy Forum, supra note 9. 
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orphanages around the world have a living parent.”66 Further, “The 
majority of so-called orphans adopted from Africa have at least one 
living parent and many children are trafficked or sold by their par-
ents.”67 “It is a myth that children in orphanages have no parents. 
Most are there because their parents simply can’t afford to feed, 
clothe, and educate them.”68 “[P]arents who hand over their children 
may hope to give them a better education or believe they will be re-
turned to them when they are older.”69 Not paying enough attention 
to these considerations can lead to difficulties such as withdrawn 
children and split personalities.70 Opponents would argue that the 
American race-neutral approach does not apply, either. Notwith-
standing any constitutional challenges,71 opponents would insist that 
 
 66. Most ‘Orphans’ Have a Living Parent, Says Charity, BBC News (Nov. 24, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/8375579.stm [hereinafter Living Parent] (quoting Corin-
na Csáky, Save the Children, Keeping Children out of Harmful Institutions (2009), 
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Keeping_ Chil-
dren_Out_of_Harmful_Institutions_Final_20.11.09_1.pdf). 
 67. Adoption from Africa, supra note 5. 
 68. Living Parent, supra note 66. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Experiences of adoptees are not homogeneous. In a research study of Korean adopt-
ees’ perception of international adoption, a number of respondents provided different com-
ments in response to the question, “How did you think of yourself ethnically as you were grow-
ing up?” Some adoptees expressed difficulty in having a clear sense of ethnicity when they were 
growing up: “I always felt slightly like a ‘fraud’ since I was not really a Korean, nor did I feel I 
was accepted as an ‘American’ like Caucasians. It is real hard to feel ‘American’ when strangers 
constantly asked me ‘Where are you from?’ and ‘How long have been you been here?’” Other 
adoptees struggled with being Korean or Asian versus being “white,” describing themselves as 
they were growing up as “Amerasian trying to be ‘white;’” “Not ‘white’ enough;” and “Cauca-
sian, except when looking in the mirror [when] I was reminded that I was Korean.” Others stat-
ed that as they were growing up, they saw themselves as Caucasian or white. These adoptees 
described themselves as “Caucasian who happened to look different;” “Caucasian with a differ-
ence;” “a white person in an Asian body;” and “white middle class, but adopted from Korea.” 
Other adoptees said that as they were growing up, they identified with their adoptive family’s or 
adoptive country’s heritage or culture, considering themselves to be “Irish, Italian, German and 
Korean;” “Scandinavian;” “Caucasian Italian American;” and “as [part of an] English, German, 
Jewish, White family.” Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, The Gathering of the First Gener-
ation of Adult Korean Adoptees: Adoptees’ Perceptions of International Adoption, Adoption Insti-
tute (June 2000), http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/proed/korfindings.html. 
 71. See Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 104–
188, § 1808, 110 Stat. 1903–1904 (1996) (mandating that an adoption may not be denied on the 
basis of the race of the child, or the adopting parent). As amended by the Interethnic Adoption 
Provisions of 1996, any agency that receives federal financial assistance is prohibited from de-
laying or denying a child’s foster care or adoptive placement on the basis of the child’s or the 
prospective parents’ race. 
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adopting an African American child is not the same as adopting an 
African child. In any case, opponents would point out that in the 
proper legal climate, many adoption agencies would be reluctant to 
place black children with white parents72 because white parents are 
unlikely to provide black children with “Black survival skills.”73 
Some critics have also argued that intercountry adoptions result  
in the transfer of children from the least advantaged women to the 
most advantaged. At the same time, such adoptions, per se, do noth-
ing to alleviate the conditions in the societies or communities from 
which the children come and thus do nothing to change the condi-
tions that place some women in the position of being unable to care 
for their children themselves.74 
Opponents also take note of a growing trend of celebrity inter-
country adoptions from Africa and argue that the promise of a mate-
rially better life is not necessarily in the best interest of the child. 
One example is David Banda, the Malawian child adopted by Ma-
donna. David Banda’s mother died soon after his birth, his parents 
had lost two of his siblings to malaria, and he faced the prospect of 
living in a country where the majority of the population live on less 
than a dollar a day.75 Malawi is one of the least developed countries 
in the world, has an infant mortality rate of 94 per thousand, and 
about one in seven people have HIV/AIDS.76 David Banda’s father 
was still alive at the time of his adoption.77 Not only did Madonna 
offer to adopt Banda, she donated $3 million to help 900,000 Mala-
wian orphans with food, school, and shelter.78 All the judges under-
stood that David Banda would be joining Madonna in her $15 mil-
lion London home and that his life expectancy was in the process of 
doubling from forty years in Malawi to seventy-eight years in Britain 
 
 72. Bartholet, supra note 36, at 1165. 
 73. James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus Between Putative 
Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J. Fam. L. 487, 510 (1988), cited 
in Stark, supra note 43, at 291. 
 74. Twila L. Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and 
Feminist Legal Theory, 10 Yale J.L. & Feminism 101, 102 (1998). 
 75. Nancy Gibbs, With Her Malawi Adoption, Did Madonna Save a Life or Buy a Baby?, 
Time (Oct. 22, 2006), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1549282,00.html. 
 75. Peter Singer, Madonna and Child, Project Syndicate (Nov. 9, 2006), 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/madonna-and-child. 
 77. Gibbs, supra note 75. 
 78. Id. 
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almost overnight.79 “Suddenly, David became the world’s best-
known Malawian because it was his good fortune to be adopted by 
Madonna.”80 
In light of this, skeptics wonder whether the best interests of 
Banda were the overarching considerations in the mind of the Mala-
wian judges. Critics argue that celebrity adoptions are fueled by com-
petition over who can do the most for the poor.81 Importantly, pro-
spective adoptive families do not have to wield the Madonna clout for 
the adoption to be problematic; it suffices that they come from a 
more developed country, as rich nations lead the way in the amount 
of adopters.82 Strictly speaking, David was not an orphan. His father, 
a potato farmer, brought him to the orphanage—but that was because 
he was too poor and too broken to take care of him anymore. Even 
with the consent of David’s father, (David’s father would later say he 
had not understood that his son no longer belonged to him and 
might never return to Malawi83) consideration of the best interests of 
the child demands that the Courts must first consider that a father’s 
love is paramount and trumps the prospect of a baby being taken 
away to be raised in splendor.84 Relatedly, some African states and 
opponents maintain that intercountry adoptions are “imperialistic.”85 
Some opponents maintain that African States are weary of a new 
form of imperialism,86 “allowing dominant, developed cultures to 
 
 79. See id. 
 79. Singer, supra note 76. 
 81. Gibbs, supra note 75. Not that this is not a bad area to compete in, so long as the 
best interests of the child are not endangered. 
 82. Chege Mbitiru, Madonna Joins Rush to Adopt Children, Nation (Kenya) 
(Oct. 23, 2006), http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-153279526/madonna-joins-rush-
adopt.html. 
 83. Singer, supra note 76. 
 84. Gibbs, supra note 75. It would appear that very few parents know “they are giving up 
all legal rights to their children.” Csáky, supra note 66, at 8. And often, adoptive parents do not 
know the true background of the youngster. Id.; see also Gertrude Lynn Hiwa, The Law and In-
tercountry Adoption: The Malawi Experience, Fifth Int’l Pol’y Conf. on Afr. Child, 
http://www.africanchildforum.org/ipc/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2012) (“There have been reports 
that after an adoption order, parents or guardians go back to the orphanages or indeed Non-
Governmental Organizations which deal with children issues and complain that at the time of 
the adoption proceedings they did not fully appreciate the consequences of an adoption order 
and request the return of their child.”). 
 85. Mezmur, supra note 38, at 8. 
 86. These perceptions feed off statistics indicating that adoptions are overwhelmingly 
unidirectional. For example, 73 children were adopted from America to other countries in 
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strip away a developing country’s most precious resources, its chil-
dren.”87 Opponents argue that 
intercountry adoption forces the adopted child to assimilate into 
western society in a manner that is reminiscent of colonial attempts 
to indoctrinate indigenous peoples into European values and learn-
ing . . . [such that] the adopted child loses an essential aspect of the 
child’s identity by being removed from his or her birth country.88 
Lemn Sissay, a high-profile former adoptee and a United King-
dom-based poet and playwright, argues that non-Africans should be 
closely observed when seeking to adopt African children because 
“taking a child from another culture is an act of aggression.”89 Han-
nah Wosene Kebam, a thirty-year-old Ethiopian who was adopted by 
a Norwegian family but managed to reunite with her Ethiopian fami-
ly, reiterated these sentiments, stating, “Growing up in Norway has 
been very good . . . I grew up strong, I got what I need, and I am a 
happy girl, but it is difficult to grow up in a family who are white, in 
school they are white and even at workplaces.”90 Kebam felt isolated 
due to her race, and feels that any foster parents who claim not to 
care about a child’s race “must be colour-blind.”91 In Kebam’s view,  
For the child it is not enough to say that the child is getting good 
food and education—who he is and where he comes from matter a 
great deal to the child. . . . It is because of the neglect of the issue of 
identity that you see many adopted children going down the drain 
despite getting the best food in the world.92 
Opponents also argue that prospective adoptive parents primarily 
seek to satisfy their self-interest and not necessarily the best interest 
of the adoptable child. David Smolin maintains, for example, “Every-
one understands that prospective adoptive parents are, in crude 
terms, ‘in it for the baby.’”93 This would be a consequentialist (serv-
 
2011, while 9320 children were adopted into the United States. Intercountry Adoption Statistics 
for 2011, Adoption Under One Roof, http://ouradopt.com/adoption-blog/nov-2011/lisas/ 
intercountry-adoption-statistics-2011 (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
 87. Martin, supra note 45, at 174. 
 88. Waddington, supra note 13, at 86. 
 89. Living Parent, supra note 66. 
 90. Adow, supra note 26. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking, 39 Val. U. L. Rev. 281, 
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ing concrete interests of the adopter) conception of intercountry 
adoption,94 in contrast to a deontological conception, which focuses 
on the need of the unparented to be adopted per se.95 A consequen-
tialist approach to intercountry adoptions from Africa has been traced 
to a number of factors. 
In the 1960s, most Western countries experienced declines in the 
number of white babies available for adoption due to the increased 
use of contraception, the availability of abortion, the general ac-
ceptance of single parenthood as well as public support for single 
mothers. As the number of white intercountry adoptable children 
decreased, prospective adopters turned their attention to intracoun-
try transracial adoptions.96 
Additionally, there has been a phenomenon of “shopping” for an 
adoptable child—the attempt by adopters to find a child “that best 
fits their personal needs.”97 For example, some adoption agencies, 
such as the European Adoption Consultants, Inc., advertise “the 
availability of ‘Caucasian and Eurasian children’ on their website, 
while Aurora International Adoptions offers ‘the unique opportunity 
to choose a desired child on your own,’” advertisements that appear 
to focus on the adopters’ desires, thus “eliminating the selfless sense 
of compassion previously associated with the adoption process.”98 
Regardless of how self-serving it seems, this is precisely the type of 
 
304 (2004–05). It has been observed that 
[the] interest in intercountry adoption is likely to increase in the foreseeable future as 
demand for children, particularly infants, increases among families in the United 
States and other western countries. Advances in contraception, the legalization of 
abortion, and the increased tendency of single parents to raise their biological chil-
dren have, in combination, dramatically reduced the number of children available for 
adoption in the United States and other western countries” and rising infertility rates 
have created a large population of prospective intercountry adoptive parents within 
the United States. 
Waddington, supra note 13, at 83–84. 
 94. Paulo Barrozo, Finding Home in the World: A Deontological Theory of the Right to be 
Adopted, 55 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 701, 704 (2010–2011). 
 95. Id. at 714. 
 96. Tshepo Mosikatsana, Intercountry Adoptions: Is there a Need for New Provisions in the 
Child Care Act?, 16 SAJHR 46, 49–50 (2000). 
 97. Katherine Herrmann, Reestablishing the Humanitarian Approach to Adoption: The Legal 
and Social Change Necessary to End the Commodification of Children, 44 Fam. L.Q. 409, 414 
(2010). 
 98. Id. 
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screening that could alleviate problems of the sort experienced by the 
Hansen family.99 
Relatedly, critics of intercountry adoption bluntly claim: 
“Stripped of all humanitarian justification, intercountry adoption is a 
commercialized and corrupt system driven by the demand of rich 
Western adults for children.”100 “The problem is a global one, but 
cases are especially high in parts of Africa and Eastern Europe.”101 
“[C]hildren have become ‘commodities’” and “unscrupulous institu-
tions are known to recruit children in order to profit from interna-
tional adoption and child trafficking.”102 
The most ardent critics of intercountry adoption, such as Baron-
ess Nicholson, oppose it because it “has been hijacked by the child 
traffickers.”103 These critics insist that this goes on even in countries 
with developed rule of law. For example, the United States has “failed 
to purge trafficking from intercountry adoption.”104 As Smolin has 
observed, this happens because “[t]he law and practice regarding 
money and adoption turn out to be so mired in legal fictions and reg-
ulatory gaps as to make it extraordinarily difficult to distinguish be-
tween licit and illicit payments.”105 The fact that private agencies 
charge vastly different sums for legitimate birth parent expenses 
based on the race of the child only augments this narrative, for “it 
might cost thirty-thousand dollars to adopt a white infant but only 
ten-thousand dollars to adopt an African-American infant.”106 But 
critics say that birth parent expenses could turn out to be the implicit 
sale of children as “the distinction between assistance and induce-
ment can be difficult to define.”107 Proof of an inducement, or a quid 
pro quo, ultimately turns on the inner motivations and understanding 
 
 99. See Pickert, supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 100. David M. Smolin, Child Laundering: How the Intercountry Adoption System Legitimizes 
and Incentivizes the Practices of Buying, Trafficking, Kidnaping, and Stealing Children, 52 Wayne L. 
Rev. 113, 116 (2006). 
 101. Living Parent, supra note 66. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Carlson, supra note 1, at 741. 
 104. Patricia J. Meier, Small Commodities: How Child Traffickers Exploit Children and Fami-
lies in Intercountry Adoption and What the United States Must Do to Stop Them, 12 J. Gender 
Race & Just. 185, 223 (2008–2009). 
 105. Smolin, supra note 93, at 282. 
 106. Id. at 305. 
 107. Id. at 311. 
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of the parties. “[T]he law’s current permission of ‘gifts,’ ‘expenses,’ 
and ‘services’ makes the law’s prohibition of selling parental rights 
and children largely illusory.”108 Birth parents “frequently will not be 
cooperative with investigative authorities, given their own legal, so-
cial, and financial vulnerabilities.”109 
Another criticism of intercountry adoption is that certain coun-
tries’ adoption agencies do not ensure full disclosure of potential dif-
ficulties with certain children, and only those children who are al-
ready problematic are being offered for intercountry adoption. For 
instance, it has been claimed that Russian agencies sometimes dump 
fetal alcoholic and sociopathic kids to unsuspecting American families 
desperate for children—this was the defense of the mother who put 
the Russian boy on the plane back to Russia.110 In light of this, oppo-
nents would argue that it is better to find solutions at source, rather 
than outsource the problem. 
Many political leaders and officials of sending nations also con-
tend that adoption amounts to “a shameful admission to the world of 
a government’s inability to care for its own.”111 Critics also maintain 
that “intercountry adoption is simply used to treat symptoms of social 
and economic issues in sending countries.”112 Some critics also argue 
that “allowing international adoptions diverts attention, and thereby 
important resources, from in-country programs such as foster care 
and relief for struggling families.”113 “Even properly conducted” in-
tercountry adoption, some say, is meaningless. This is because “it 
presents an idealized life for small numbers of children, as an alterna-
tive to a global policy.”114 Instead, it is suggested that “the elimina-
 
 108. Id. at 322. 
 109. Id. at 311. 
 110. Damien Cave & Clifford J. Levy, Child in Adoption Case is an American Citizen, Not 
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tion of economic disparities, the writing off of Third World debt and 
giving aid to Third World countries will address the problems which 
create the need for intercountry adoptions.”115 
B. Arguments in Favor of African Intercountry Adoption 
Regardless of where one stands in the debate regarding the merits 
or demerits of intercountry adoption, it is undeniable that intercoun-
try adoption retains the potential to serve the best interests of chil-
dren in certain circumstances. It is for this reason that international 
law has increasingly embraced the practice, even if cautiously at first. 
This Article urges African nations to move in this direction and, in 
light of the increased rate of intercountry adoptions from Africa, to 
do so with a sense of urgency. It is important to address some argu-
ments raised against African intercountry adoption and to point out 
why, in spite of the demerits, it would still be a worthwhile practice. 
On its face, the argument based on imperialism appears to have 
merit: after all, “[i]ntercountry adoption typically involves an ex-
change between a developing country and an industrialized coun-
try.”116 But that alone is insufficient grounds for denying intercoun-
try adoption because not every prospective adoptive parent is 
motivated by the idea of depriving African countries of their best re-
sources—children. In actuality, intercountry adoptions appear to aid 
many African countries that are simply incapable of looking after 
children at a particularly vulnerable time in their lives. Proponents 
maintain that “[i]nternational adoption . . . relieves resource-starved 
nations of the burden of supporting unparented children and the ad-
ditional costs those children will predictably exact as they graduate 
from childhoods of deprivation to adulthood—where they will dis-
proportionately populate the ranks of the unemployed, the homeless, 
and the incarcerated.”117 
Proponents also argue that “[t]hose attacking . . . [intercountry] 
adoption as being in conflict with children’s heritage rights are speak-
ing a language of a past in which it was common to see people as es-
 
Adoption & Fostering 75, 80 (1991), cited in Mosikatsana, supra note 48, at 62. 
 115. Mosikatsana, supra note 48, at 62. 
 116. Shani King, Challenging Monohumanism: An Argument for Changing the Way We 
Think About Intercountry Adoption, 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 413, 425 (2008–2009). 
 117. Bartholet, supra note 51, at 783. 
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sentially defined by their race and national origin.”118 Why, they ask, 
have intercountry adoptions only increased since the 1950’s despite 
these criticisms? It appears that globalization119 has something to do 
with it, although other factors are also at play.120 In any event, inter-
national law recognizes and addresses these cultural arguments. For 
example, the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption121 (Hague Conven-
tion) provides that “due consideration” should be given to the child’s 
“ethnic, religious and cultural background.”122 This would still be in-
sufficient for critics who argue that “cultural background” designates 
a source of information or data rather than a determination of cultur-
al identity in and of itself.123 Notably, the drafters of the Hague Con-
vention were of the view that “it is important that the adoptive child 
retains links with his or her past, and have an understanding of his or 
her background.”124 Indeed, some adoption agencies pay attention to 
cultural issues and try to “arrange ‘roots trips’ to adoptees’ birth 
countries, culture education camps, and other gatherings with the 
aim of instilling in adoptees pride in their birth culture.”125 
The insistence that vulnerable African children must be raised in 
an African culture is not defensible in every adoption, especially if the 
child is raised to appreciate diversity.126 This line of argument insists: 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. See generally Jini L. Roby, Rhetoric to Best Practice: Children’s Rights in Intercountry 
Adoption, 27 Child. Legal Rts. J. 48 (2007). 
 120. But some studies go in the opposite direction, indicating that “transracially adopted 
children seem to have better relationships with Whites and are more comfortable in racially 
integrated settings. A recent study indicates that there may not be any real connection between 
positive self-esteem and being adopted inracially,” and that for “inter-country adoptions to be 
successful from the child’s perspective, the adopting parents must have the proper attitudes and 
racial perspectives.” Mark Eade, Inter-Country Adoption: International, National and Cultural Con-
cerns, 57 Sask. L. Rev. 381, 386 (1993). 
 121. Hague Convention, supra note 63, art. 16(b). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Martin, supra note 45, at 204. 
 124. G. Parra-Aranguren, Explanatory Report on the Convention on Protection of Chil-
dren and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, ¶ 314 (HCCH Publications 
1994) (offprint from Proceedings of the Seventeenth Session (1993), tome II, Adoption 
Co-Operation) available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications. de-
tails&pid=2279&dtid=3. 
 125. Johansson & Lind, supra note 60, at 236. 
 126. Lynette Clemetson, Adopted in China, Seeking Identity in America, N.Y. Times 
(Mar. 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/23/national/23adopt.html . 
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[t]he fact that these families are built across lines of racial and cul-
tural difference can be seen as a good thing, both for the parents 
and children involved and for the larger community. These . . . 
families . . . learn to appreciate one another’s differences . . . while 
at the same time experiencing their common humanity.127 
Ben Douglas, a black man adopted by white parents, said: 
I’m brought up in the UK so I’m British, that should be my culture 
. . . I feel very blessed and very lucky to have had the childhood that 
I’ve had . . . The alternative would have been residential care. I’m 
sure there’s [sic] great children’s homes, but it’s not the same as 
having a loving, nurturing family . . . Why should the colour of 
someone’s skin, or their eye colour, or their hair colour, be a barrier 
to having a loving family?128 
Proponents contend that the argument favoring the right of chil-
dren to their ethnic, religious, and cultural background perhaps bet-
ter serves the interests of ethnic groups than those of the child.129 
They maintain that what should matter is whether there is uncondi-
tional love of adoptive parents for their child regardless of the child’s 
background.130 Supporters even maintain that there is no evidence 
that children are genetically predisposed to a particular cultural iden-
tity.131 Instead, research shows internationally adopted children do 
essentially as well as other adopted children.132 
Proponents would concede that the argument that a child might 
be injured by separation from his or her cultural origin is somewhat 
more plausible in the case of older children.133 One study, however, 
in comparing the outcomes of Romanian children adopted by Roma-
nian families and Romanian children adopted by American families, 
showed significant differences in the behavioral outcome of the chil-
dren. Children adopted within their own country showed fewer man-
 
 127. Bartholet, supra note 36, at 183. 
 128. Mixed-Race Adoption: ‘I Had Loving Family,’ BBC News (Feb. 19, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12514433. 
 129. Johansson & Lind, supra note 60, at 238. 
 130. Id. at 256. 
 131. See Bartholet, supra note 50, at 361 (“[T]he studies of children adopted across racial 
and national lines reveal no evidence that growing up separated from one’s group of origin has 
any negative impact whatsoever on the child.”). 
 132. Id. at 349. 
 133. Carlson, supra note 10, at 747. 
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ifestations of behavioral problems and were less of a source of stress 
to their adoptive parents, even as the study carefully notes that the 
children adopted by American families were institutionalized longer 
during critical developmental times (pre-adoption), and tended to be 
older at the time of the study.134 
From a purely pragmatic standpoint, it is sometimes impossible 
to avoid transracial adoptions. At least in the United States, a large 
number of the people actively looking to adopt are white, and for the 
most part they want white children, at least initially.135 But the reality 
is that there are “very few white children by comparison to the large 
pool of would-be white adopters.”136 This mirrors the situation of 
the numerous adoptable African children, but with very few prospec-
tive African adopters coming forward. 
Ultimately, intercountry adoption is sometimes the only option 
towards securing the best interests of the child, offering justification 
for the practice even on ethical grounds. This seems to be the under-
lying premise to observations made by the Holy See during negotia-
tions for the Hague Convention. The Holy See noted: 
[C]hildren are not isolated individuals but are born in and belong to 
a particular environment. Only if this native environment cannot, in 
one way or another, provide for a minimum of care and education 
should adoption be contemplated. The possibility of providing a 
better material future is certainly not, of itself, a sufficient reason 
for resorting to adoption.137 
 
 134. Roby, supra note 119, at 53. 
 135. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1163, 1166 
(1990). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Parra-Aranguren, supra note 124, ¶ 47. 
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III. Analysis of International Regulatory Framework 
Although African countries are parties to some international trea-
ties relevant to intercountry adoption, they have largely refrained 
from joining the more important international regulatory regimes. 
Since African countries are experiencing a surge in intercountry 
adoptions, it is important to analyze the safeguards and best practices 
to which African countries can more comfortably relate and aspire. 
A. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child138 
At the global level, the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC), which became enforceable in 1990, was an effort 
to distinguish human rights that specifically protect children. Among 
other things, the CRC presented the first opportunity to regulate in-
tercountry adoptions and, because it has been almost universally rati-
fied, it can safely be assumed to be extremely influential. While most 
African states are parties to the CRC,139 it does not offer a compre-
hensive legal framework. In a less than enthusiastic manner, Article 
21 of the CRC provides that intercountry adoption may be consid-
ered as an alternative means of child-care if the child cannot suitably 
be cared for domestically. This so-called subsidiary principle requires 
that priority be given to placing the child with his or her family of 
origin and that domestic measures be given preference over inter-
country adoption.140 
In similar regard, the United Nations Committee on the Rights 
of the Child (UNCRC) stated that “[p]riority must be given to adop-
tion by relatives in their country of residence. Where this is not an 
option, preference will be given to adoption within the community 
from which the child came or at least within his or her own cul-
ture.”141 
 
 138. Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations (Nov. 20, 1989), 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1990/09/19900902%2003-14%20AM/Ch_IV_11p.pdf 
[hereinafter CRC]. 
 139. Fifty African States are signatories. See id. 
 140. De Gree v. Webb 2008 (4) BCLR 359 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 141. Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin, 
U.N. CRC, 39th Sess., May 17–June 3, 2005, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6, 25 ¶ 91 (Sept. 1, 
2005) [hereinafter Treatment]. 
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African courts have validated this principle. South African courts 
have held that “to ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiari-
ty142 as expressed in Article 21 of the CRC it must be established that 
the child cannot be cared for through foster care or adoption or other 
suitable care in his or her country of origin.”143 In the South African 
case of De Gree v. Webb, baby R was found “abandoned a few days af-
ter her birth, head-first in a bucket, under a tree.”144 By the time of 
the case, R’s parents and other family members had not been 
traced.145 The appellants, who were African Americans, met R, “be-
came extremely fond of her, and took steps towards adopting her.”146 
However, the court found that there was evidence “as to the availabil-
ity of prospective local adoptive parents, including black South Afri-
cans, eager to adopt female children from birth to five years of 
age.”147 Because there was a possibility of adoption to local parents, 
the African American couple was denied the adoption, as intercoun-
try adoption is allowed only in last resort situations. The CRC’s “last 
resort language” is relative, so it “depends on what options are availa-
ble as alternative care.”148 Therefore, it must be viewed as comple-
mentary to the best interests principle, which considers what options 
are in the best interest of the child. 149 The South African Constitu-
tional Court stated that while the principle of subsidiarity must be 
adhered to, this is “not to say the principle of subsidiarity is the ulti-
mate governing factor in intercountry adoptions.”150 It is, rather, the 
best interests of the child principle that has been found to be the ul-
timate governing factor.151 
 
 142. Adoption Law in Romania-In the Best Interest of the Children?, Ctr. for Adoption 
Pol’y, http://www.adoptionpolicy.org/pdf/Analysis%20of%20Current%20Romanian%20Law 
3.06.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). Under the UNCRC, the principle of subsidiarity is that “in-
tercountry adoptions is only subsidiary to a permanent family in the child’s country of origin 
(whether his biological family or an adoptive family) and cannot be subsidiary to institutional-
ized care in the country of origin.” Id. This means that intercountry adoption is only to be seen 
as a secondary option to in-country adoption, and not to institutionalized care. 
 143. De Gree v. Webb 2008 (4) BCLR 359 (CC) at 15 para. 22 (S. Afr.). 
 144. Id. at para. 2. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 2 para. 3. 
 147. Id. at 17 para. 25. 
 148. Mezmur, Supra note 38, at 92. 
 149. See id. at 90. 
 150. AD v. DW 2007 ZACC (CC) at para. 49 (S.Afr.). 
 151. Id. 
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Recognizing the argument based on culture, Article 20(3) of the 
CRC provides that, when considering alternative care solutions, “due 
regard ought to be taken of the desirability of continuity in a child’s 
upbringing and to the “ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic back-
ground.”152 For this reason, the CRC endorses intercountry adoption 
only if the child cannot be placed in “any suitable manner” in the 
child’s nation of origin.153 In In re M (Child’s Upbringing), the issue 
was whether it was in a nine-year-old child’s best interest to remain 
in Britain with his foster mother or to return to his biological parents 
in South Africa.154 With the parents’ consent, the foster mother took 
the child to Britain.155 Subsequently, the biological parents initiated 
legal proceedings to have the child returned after they discovered 
that the foster mother was trying to adopt him.156 At the court hear-
ing, the boy, then ten years old, expressed a desire not to return to 
live in South Africa.157 However, Lord Justice Neill maintained that 
the child “has the right to be reunited with his Zulu parents and with 
his extended family in South Africa,”158 because the child’s develop-
ment “must be, in the last resort and profoundly, Zulu development 
and not Afrikaans or English development.”159 
To opponents of intercountry adoption, the CRC’s “‘suitable’” 
placement within the nation of origin might include an institution or 
an undefined form of foster care.”160 To those who would favor insti-
tutionalization in such circumstances, the subsidiarity principle 
should trump the best interests principle. But, in light of the forego-
ing discussion, this interpretation would be inappropriate in the case 
of institutionalization,161 simply because it is an available “last resort” 
 
 152. Treatment, supra note 141, at 13. 
 153. CRC, supra note 138, at art. 21(b). 
 154. In re M (Child’s Upbringing) (1996) 2 F.L.R. 441 (CA) 2 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1996/1320.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
 155. Id. at 3. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 7. 
 158. Id. at 10. 
 159. Id. (quoting Thorpe J.). 
 160. Carlson, supra note 10, at 737. 
 161. In research comparing “children who had been reared in institutions until being 
placed in foster care at approximately three years of age and children who had mainly lived with 
foster families, the researchers discovered that the former group displayed more frequent prob-
lem behaviors than the latter group, including restlessness, hyperactivity, aggression, and affec-
tive impoverishment.” Wechsler, supra note 7, at 11 n.66 (citing William Goldfarb, The Effects 
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in the country of origin when intercountry adoption would be an op-
tion.162 
Additionally, addressing a core concern, the CRC provides that 
parties to the CRC shall “[t]ake all appropriate measures to ensure 
that, in intercountry adoption, the placement does not result in im-
proper financial gain for those involved in it.”163 This was because 
the negotiators of the CRC recognized that “the existing situation re-
veals that it is not only the intermediary bodies that are attracted by 
improper financial gain, because as it has sometimes happened, law-
yers, notaries, public servants, even judges and university professors, 
have either requested or accepted excessive amounts of money or lav-
ish gifts from prospective adoptive parents.”164 One way to avoid this 
problem is for countries of origin to strictly regulate the amount of 
money that is paid to organizations and persons involved in the adop-
tion process. South Africa is a good example of how this can be 
done.165 
 
of Early Institutional Care on Adolescent Personality, 14 CHILD DEV. 213, 222 (1943)) (“Atypical 
behavior has also been identified among children living in orphanages, including aggression, 
hyperactivity, attention-seeking, emotional withdrawal and inhibition, and indiscriminate 
friendliness.”). Although not necessarily applicable to every African institution, researchers 
looking into effects of Russian orphanages found that “children three and under lose one IQ 
point for every month spent inside.” Pickert, supra note 21. 
 162. See Carlson, supra note 10, at 734 (“The subsidiarity principle is destructive to chil-
dren’s interests in actual practice because it delays or completely prevents family placement for 
thousands of children in need, diverting many into unhealthy institutions or questionable ‘fos-
ter’ arrangements.”). 
 163. CRC, supra note 138, at art. 21(d). 
 164. Parra-Aranguren, supra note 124, ¶ 527 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Article 
32 of the Hague Convention does not state the consequences of its violation, but undoubtedly 
the refusal of automatic recognition of the adoption would be too much in many cases.” For 
this reason, Spain and some other participants at the Hague Convention “felt that it made little 
sense to formulate general prohibitions without indicating the effects of their possible viola-
tion.” Id. ¶ 529. 
 165. In South Africa, for example, the state regulates the sums of money paid to accredit-
ed organizations through the Regulations of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 and, to prevent im-
proper financial gain, “audited financial statements of accredited organizations must be submit-
ted to the Central Authority for control and monitoring purposes.” Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, Country Profile: South Africa, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details& pid=5164 
&dtid=42 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
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B. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography166 
A specific concern that is associated with intercountry adoption is 
the possibility that adopted children, so far away and out of reach 
from their countries of origin, might end up being trafficked for pur-
poses such as prostitution or pornography. The Committee on the 
Rights of the Child indeed noted that “there is often a link between 
trafficking and the situation of separated and unaccompanied chil-
dren,”167 and that this is usually for “purposes of sexual or other ex-
ploitation or involvement in criminal activities which could result in 
harm to the child, or in extreme cases, in death.”168 Many African 
countries simply do not have the resources to follow up after an 
adoption has occurred. 
An instrument such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitu-
tion and Child Pornography (OPCRC), which places obligations on 
state parties to combat such practices, can allay those concerns. Most 
African countries are State Parties to the OPCRC.169 The OPCRC 
defines the “sale of children” as “any act or transaction whereby a 
child is transferred by any person or group of persons to another for 
remuneration or any other consideration.”170 Pertinently, the 
OPCRC prohibits “[i]mproperly inducing consent, as an intermedi-
ary, for the adoption of a child in violation of applicable international 
legal instruments on adoption.”171 The fact that forty-eight African 
countries have ratified the OPCRC indicates they take the issue of 
trafficking172 and sale of children seriously and of great concern.173 
 
 166. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263 (LXXXV), U.N. 
GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, at 6 (May 25, 2000) [hereinafter 
OPCRC]. 
 167. CRC, supra note 138, ¶ 23. 
 168. Id. 
 169. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Chapter IV, 11.c, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-
c&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
 170. OPCRC, supra note 166, at art. 2(a). 
 171. Id. at art. 3(a)(ii). 
 172. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed its concern in 
respect to Malawi that there was a “possible use of intercountry adoption for the purpose of 
trafficking.” Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Rep on the 29th Sess., Jan. 14–Feb. 1, 2002, at 
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The OPCRC, however, “[does] not address situations where adoptive 
families directly purchase children from birth parents without use of 
an intermediary.”174 African countries cannot be said to have done 
enough simply by becoming State Parties to the OPCRC. 
C. The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition 
of Decrees Relating to Adoption (1965) 
The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and 
Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoption of 1965 (“Convention 
on Adoption Jurisdiction”)175 was the first international measure to 
regulate intercountry adoption in a binding manner. Under the Con-
vention on Adoption Jurisdiction, the power to grant adoptions is 
vested in the adopter’s state,176 but the adoptee’s state has authority 
over “consents and consultations,” other than those relating to the 
adopter and his family.177 
However, the Convention on Adoption Jurisdiction was not suc-
cessful in attracting membership. Only three states became State Par-
 
104 U.N. Doc CRC/C/114 (2002) UNCRC, Concluding Observations of Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, Malawi, ¶ 442, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/114, at 104 (2002). In Mali, a man’s four-year-
old daughter was abducted from in front of his house in September [2009]. Martin Vogl, Fear 
Over Mali’s Missing Children, BBC News (Aug. 16, 2010, 3:24 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10766241. Four months later, a friend saw the young 
girl in central Bamako. Id. The girl was with a German couple who had legally adopted her and 
were going to take her to Germany in a couple of days. Id. The agency that organized the adop-
tion, Help A Child, said they relied on the documentation the orphanage gave them and that “it 
is impossible for them to do their own investigation into where a child comes from.” Id. This 
does not appear to be an isolated incident; there are serious flaws in the adoption procedures in 
Mali and police never take cases of missing children seriously. Additionally, in 2004 police ar-
rested and charged eight men regarding illegal child trafficking in Madagascar. Tim Healy, 
Madagascar Breaks Child Traffic Ring, BBC News (Apr. 16, 2004, 4:36 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3633087.stm. “The eight accused Malagasy men were alleged 
to be part of an illegal adoption ring that offered financial incentives of up to $800 for every 
young baby they [found].” Id. It was observed that this could be partly attributed to “poverty as 
poor young single mothers were prepared to give up a child in return for cash.” Id. The “major-
ity of babies were destined to be adopted by couples from France,” who in most cases were “un-
aware of the illegality as genuine documents [were] usually provided by corrupt government 
officials working with the traffickers.” Id. 
 173. See OPCRC, supra, note 166. 
 174. Smolin, supra note 100, at 300–01. 
 175. Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adop-
tions, Nov. 15, 1965, 1107 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter Convention on Adoption Jurisdiction]. 
 176. Id. at art. 3. 
 177. Id. at art. 5. 
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ties to it—Austria, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.178 It still 
entered into force, because Article 19 provides that the “Convention 
shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after the deposit of the third 
instrument of ratification.”179 However, it is irrelevant in so far as 
most of the world is concerned. At the time it was adopted, “inter-
country adoption was widely expected to develop into a mainly Euro-
pean phenomenon, which explains the contents of the Convention: 
emphasis was given to the unification of private international law 
rules with regard to European traditions in this field.”180 Additional-
ly, the Convention on Adoption Jurisdiction was not strong enough 
because it allowed contracting parties to disregard the agreement 
when observance with its provisions would be contrary to their public 
policy.181 The Convention on Adoption Jurisdiction would have little 
relevance for most African states, except to the extent it could act as a 
model for their domestic legislation with regard to recognition of 
adoptions carried out abroad.182 
D. The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
Respect to Intercountry Adoption 
To date, the Hague Convention remains the most important and 
comprehensive instrument for international control and cooperation 
regarding intercountry adoption.183 The development of the Hague 
Convention was an outgrowth of globalization and the recognition 
 
 178. Id. at 39 n.1. 
 179. Id. at art. 19. 
 180. Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg, Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercoun-
try Adoption, 63 Nordic J. Int’l L. 185, 186 (1994). 
 181. Convention on Adoption Jurisdiction, supra note 175, at art. 15. 
 182. Id. at art. 23 (in accordance with Article 23 of the Convention, it ceased to have ef-
fect as of Oct. 23, 2008). 
 183. Some information regarding prospective adoptive parents (PAP) would not be avail-
able to the country of origin without the cooperation of the receiving state, which the Hague 
Convention facilitates. For example, South Africa requires that an application by PAPs should 
include: a statement of “approval to adopt” issued by a competent authority; report on the PAPs 
including the “Home study” and other personal evaluations; copies of passports of PAPs or oth-
er personal identification documents; copies of birth certificates of PAPs and of other children 
residing with them; a copy of the marriage certificate (if married couple), divorce certificate (if 
either or both of the PAPs is divorced), or death certificate of the spouse (if one of the PAPs is 
widowed); health certificates; evidence of the financial circumstances of the family; employment 
certificates and proof of no criminal record. See Hague Conference on Private International 
Law, supra note 165 at 12. 
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that it is necessary to encourage global societal interests in protecting 
children.184 The increased interdependency of countries with regards 
to adoption also created a need for the Hague Convention.185 
The fundamental principles that underlie the Hague Convention 
are drawn from the CRC, particularly Article 21. Along with the 
CRC, the Hague Convention seeks to ensure that intercountry adop-
tions consider the best interests of the child, and that they are con-
ducted in a responsible and protective manner with the aim of elimi-
nating the various abuses which have plagued intercountry 
adoptions.186 As Richard Carlson aptly observes: “[I]nternational 
movement of children tends to compound opportunities for corrup-
tion and circumvention of the law. Even without these problems, 
sending nations deserve, and increasingly want, assurance that their 
children are not cast into an unchannelled stream of commerce but 
are guarded by law and competent authorities.”187 Certainly, inter-
country adoptions do, or at least should, “involve[] one nation en-
trusting its children to the authorities of another country and relying 
on the country to which the child is going to protect that child.”188 
The Hague Convention is probably the most comprehensive means 
to date for allaying these concerns, as it “set[s] the stage for tackling 
endemic problems of corruption and profiteering in order to elimi-
nate the profit motive from adoption-related legal structures.”189 
The Hague Convention is also “meant to create rules and guide-
lines for countries to follow when processing intercountry adoptions, 
so that there can be global uniformity and consistency.”190 
[T]he preamble explicitly recognizes the child’s right to grow up in 
a family environment and that intercountry adoption may offer the 
advantage of a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable fam-
 
 184. Annette Schmit, The Hague Convention: The Problems with Accession and Implementa-
tion, 15 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 375, 377 (2008). 
 185. Id. 
 186. DG & Another v. W & Others, 2007 (379/06) ZASCA 87 (SCA) at para. 17 (S. Afr.). 
 187. Richard R. Carlson, The Emerging Law of Intercountry Adoptions: An Analysis of the 
Hague Conference on Intercountry Adoption, 30 Tulsa L.J. 243, 246 (1994). 
 188. William L. Pierce, Accreditation of Those Who Arrange Adoptions under the Hague Con-
vention on Intercountry Adoption as a Means of Protecting, Through Private International Law, the 
Rights of Children, 12 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 535, 535 (1995–96). 
 189. Dillon, supra note 46, at 203. 
 190. Elizabeth Long, Where Are They Coming From, Where Are They Going: Demanding 
Accountability In International Adoption, 18 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 827, 828 (2012). 
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ily cannot be found in his or her State of origin. This may be seen 
as an acknowledgement that a properly made intercountry adoption 
is to be preferred to a placement of the child in an institution.191 
At the same time, the Hague Convention recognizes the subsidi-
arity principle,192 which requires that priority be given to placing the 
child with his or her family of origin and that domestic measures be 
given preference over intercountry adoption.193 
Only thirteen (or 24%) African countries194 have ratified the 
Hague Convention. This means that for most of Africa there is very 
little international protection, as few African countries are interna-
tionally obligated to the Convention.195 To be sure, the Hague Con-
vention does not cover every conceivable situation. For example, ac-
cording to Article 2 of the Hague Convention, this treaty does not 
cover “the cases where the child is habitually resident in one Con-
tracting State and the prospective adoptive parents reside habitually 
in a non-contracting State.”196 Yet, the protections that the Hague 
Convention offer are so critically important and wide-ranging that 
there are simply not enough reasons197 to justify not joining this pro-
tection regime, especially in light of the surging intercountry adop-
tions from Africa. 
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For example, the Hague Convention provides that “adoption 
within the scope of the Convention shall take place only if the com-
petent authorities of the State of origin . . . have ensured . . . consent 
has not been induced by payment or compensation of any kind.”198 
Additionally, Article 29 of the Hague Convention prohibits “personal 
contacts between the prospective adoptive parents and the child’s 
parents or any other person who has care of the child until the re-
quirements of Article 4, sub-paragraphs a to c, and Article 5, sub-
paragraph a, have been met.”199 This is intended to “minimize the 
opportunities for financial inducements to influence the birth par-
ents.”200 In many African countries, there have been several instances 
of such abuse. 
The Hague Convention establishes a critically important mecha-
nism in requiring that “Central Authorities shall co-operate with 
each other and promote co-operation amongst the competent au-
thorities in their States to protect children and to achieve the other 
objects of the Convention.”201 Therefore, under the Hague Conven-
tion each “Contracting State” is obligated to set up a “Central Au-
thority” to monitor intercountry adoptions.202 The receiving State 
must establish that the prospective adoptive parents are (legally) eli-
gible and suited (by their circumstances) to adopt and have been 
counseled.203 Thus, the Central Authority acts as “a gatekeeper, with 
all adoptions in and out of the country channeled through its system 
of checks.”204 
Because “[a]doptions are subjected to the control of a Central Au-
thority on both ends, i.e., in the country origin and in the receiving 
country,”205 it is hoped that this process can eliminate most illicit 
practices. Under the Hague Convention, Central Authorities are ob-
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ligated to take all appropriate measures to “reply, in so far as is per-
mitted by the law of their State, to justified requests from other Cen-
tral Authorities or public authorities for information about a particu-
lar adoption situation.”206 In reference to illicit practices, Central 
Authorities are important in preventing system abuses, including in-
ternational trafficking of children, which can only be monitored and 
enforced by national authorities.207 
“Because of the wide differences among legislations, [in] respect 
to methods for the structuring and exercising of control over inter-
country adoptions, it was admitted” by the negotiators of the Hague 
Convention that “it would probably be very difficult to coordinate 
their use under a convention text, unless the convention established a 
system of Central Authorities.”208 Central Authorities of contracting 
States are obliged to “collect, preserve and exchange information 
about the situation of the child and the prospective adoptive parents, 
so far as is necessary to complete the adoption,”209 and to “provide 
each other with general evaluation reports about experience with in-
tercountry adoption.”210 During the negotiations, it was noted that 
the “system of Central Authorities would offer the possibility of re-
porting offenses against criminal law ‘to the appropriate department 
so that international police or judicial co-operation may begin, if 
necessary.’”211 Also, the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau) is obligated to col-
lect information from Contracting States regarding the number of 
intercountry adoptions and the corresponding receiving states. As an 
example, the Permanent Bureau reported that Mauritius had 355 in-
 
 206. Hague Convention, supra note 63, at art. 9(e). 
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tercountry adoptions between January 1988 and March 2010212 and 
Burkina Faso had ninety-four intercountry adoptions in 2010.213 
However, it is important to note that only these three African Con-
tracting States have reported to the Permanent Bureau.214 As the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has noted, “[i]t is the experi-
ence of the Committee that data and statistics collected with regard 
to unaccompanied and separated children tends to be limited to the 
number of arrivals and/or number of requests for asylum,”215 as na-
tional authorities (countries of origin) do not track data on unaccom-
panied children and so cannot adequately “analyse issues that remain 
insufficiently addressed, such as for instance, disappearances of unac-
companied and separated children and the impact of trafficking.”216 
Moreover, if more African countries joined the Hague Conven-
tion, they could benefit from the provision stating that “[a]n adoption 
certified by the competent authority of the State of the adoption as 
having been made in accordance with the Convention shall be recog-
nized by operation of law in the other Contracting States.”217 This 
provision “[supersedes] the existing practice that an adoption already 
granted in the State of origin is to be made anew in the receiving 
State only in order to produce such effects, and also prevents a revi-
sion of the contents of the foreign adoption.”218 African countries can 
only benefit from this level of coordination as parties to the Hague 
Convention. 
From a more normative standpoint, African countries would ben-
efit from a level of uniformity promoted by the Hague Convention. 
For example, the Hague Convention regulates the effects of an adop-
tion. The effects of adoption are dealt with in Article 26, in a compli-
cated, but not limiting, manner. According to Article 26, paragraph 1: 
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The recognition of an adoption includes recognition of 
 (a) the legal parent-child relationship between the child and his 
or her adoptive parents; 
 (b) parental responsibility of the adoptive parents for the child; 
and 
 (c) the termination of a pre-existing legal relationship between 
the child and his or her mother and father, if the adoption has this 
effect in the Contracting State where it was made.219 
Each Contracting State, in recognizing the legal effects of an 
adoption, applies its own choice of law.220 
The Hague Convention, however, is not without its weaknesses. 
These weaknesses must be acknowledged even as African countries 
are urged to join its regime. By not providing for a global supervisory 
body to ensure compliance and leaving it to each State Party to 
monitor intercountry adoptions by means of its Central Authority, 
the Hague Convention leaves each Contracting State to its own re-
sources in enforcing and policing intercountry adoptions—a serious 
challenge for developing countries with meager resources and infra-
structure.221 Some African countries’ infrastructure is so undeveloped 
that many children even lack birth certificates. How are those author-
ities to avert situations where biological parents give up their child 
for financial gain?222 African countries’ poor child welfare infrastruc-
tures have led to “a lack of basic safeguards against illicit child pro-
curement practices: births are not recorded, the state does not inter-
vene to investigate abduction or the sale of children, and the state 
lacks the resources to care for vulnerable populations.”223 This is one 
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major reason why some African countries have been unable to join 
the Hague Convention.224 
Opponents also argue that the Hague Convention “is too flexible 
and does not have teeth to limit and police adoptions,” while “propo-
nents claim that [it] is too flexible and easily manipulated to limit in-
ternational adoptions.”225 Flexibility, though, was key to the success 
of the negotiations in light of entrenched interests in both camps. 
“International agreements demand flexibility to allow for the widest, 
most successful implementation among diverse nations.”226 For ex-
ample, during the Hague Convention negotiations, some “partici-
pants objected to . . . proposals, based on constitutional grounds, be-
cause they could mean an interference with the sovereignty of the 
receiving State.”227 
A risk identified in requirements of the Hague Convention is that 
[t]he Hague Convention does require each country to create a Cen-
tral Authority, but then permits countries to authorize non-state ac-
tors to continue to play a major role in international adoption. . . . 
However, many countries are likely to read the Hague’s require-
ment for a Central Authority as equivalent to mandating state mo-
nopoly control over international adoption, and those hostile to in-
ternational adoption are likely to promote this reading.228 
Critics also charge that under the Hague Convention, 
control could not possibly be made by the States of origin, taking 
into account the amount of children yearly adopted in some of 
them, and that, if abuses were detected, there would be no sanction 
provided by the Convention, . . . because criminal law was not with-
in the scope of the Convention.229 
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These tradeoffs, however, are inevitable as “the Hague Conven-
tion attempts to standardize practices among divergent nations.”230 
Indeed, “the Hague Convention leaves a good deal of discretion in 
the hands of national bureaucracies”231—so much discretion that it is 
difficult to fathom how the Convention can be enforced.232 
In drafting the Hague Convention the negotiators tried to make 
the document acceptable to the widest number of individual states, 
both member and non-member. As a result, the Hague Convention 
has “left much of the substantive law of adoption to the individual 
states.”233 Thus, the argument that the Hague Convention is a huge 
success in establishing common standards must be tempered by def-
erence to national standards and the accompanying difficulties this 
portends for intercountry adoptions. Therefore, it must be acknowl-
edged that the Hague Convention is a limited as a protective instru-
ment, as it is not intended to cover all aspects relating to intercountry 
adoption.234 “For instance, if official documents declare that a child is 
an orphan but in reality the child was stolen from his [or] her parents, 
the Hague Convention is of little use, as it does not cover the ques-
tions of birth registration and civil registry.”235 
The Hague Convention has also been criticized for its “lack of 
specificity on important aspects of intercountry adoption. . . . [It] 
does not specify characteristics that potential adopters must possess 
in order to qualify for intercountry adoption. Furthermore, the 
Hague Convention fails to define criteria for determining the ‘best 
interests of the child,’ a phrase that appears numerous times in the 
treaty.”236 Generally, these objectors call for an amendment of the 
Convention or the adoption of a protocol that covers these details, 
even if the adopted protocol is optional. 
One of the more serious charges against the Hague Conven-
tion—at least in the United States, which has the most intercountry 
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adoptions—is that the Hague Convention’s “implementing regula-
tions were heavily influenced by the adoption agency community . . . 
with the result that important protections envisioned by the Conven-
tion have been all but eviscerated. For example . . . ‘country fees’ still 
do not require itemization.”237 Unfortunately, the Hague Conven-
tion is a piece of private238 international law that does not explicitly 
spell out any consequences for Contracting States, which may decide 
the adoption procedures for resident children.239 In the realm of fam-
ily law, international law mainly deals with conflicts of law. For ex-
ample, in Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardian-
ship of Infants,240 the International Court of Justice said the purpose 
was to resolve conflicts of laws,241 adding that: 
If the 1902 Convention had intended to regulate the domain of ap-
plication of laws such as the Swedish Law on the protection of chil-
dren and young persons, it would follow that that Law should be 
applied to Swedish infants in a foreign country. But no one has 
sought to attribute such an extraterritorial effect to that Law.242 
The Hague Convention is unsupported by major sending coun-
tries,243 which conveys the message that simply creating a unified sys-
tem of intercountry adoption laws is not enough to convince some 
nations to comply. The Hague Convention should have stressed the 
need to enforce compliance of all sending and receiving countries and 
limit member States to intercountry adoptions through other mem-
ber States, thereby creating incentives for major sending countries to 
ratify. At the present time, no such incentive exists. “Despite the ap-
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pearance of moving forward in intercountry adoption laws, the lack 
of cooperation by major sending countries keeps this forward move-
ment from being a possibility.”244 
E. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child245 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Af-
rican Charter) is especially relevant for African countries. In many re-
spects, though, it simply replicates the CRC on a regional level; it is 
not a comprehensive instrument regarding intercountry adoption. 
African countries would not be doing enough simply as parties to the 
African Charter. 
With that said, article 24(b) of the African Charter is pertinent. 
The principle of subsidiarity is enshrined in this article, making in-
tercountry adoptions a “last resort.”246 Article 24(c) provides that 
every state party shall “ensure that the child affected by intercountry 
adoption enjoys safeguards and standards equivalent to those existing 
in the case of national adoption.”247 It is very difficult to implement 
this provision as a practical matter because very few African countries 
have the wherewithal to monitor or supervise the post-adoption 
phase. Moreover, short of imposing a very prohibitive regulatory re-
gime, many foreign adoptive parents cannot satisfy a residency re-
quirement even if the domestic law provided for it.248 For example, 
Malawian courts appear to appreciate the wisdom of taking such safe-
guards seriously, but they also understand that this has its limits. Jus-
tice Nyirenda notes that “[i]t is further acknowledged that because 
 
 244. Id. at 584. 
 245. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (Nov. 29, 1999) [hereinafter African Charter]. 
 246. Id. at art. 24(b). 
 247. Id. at art. 24(c). 
 248. The case law surveyed indicates that many courts struggle with the residency re-
quirement. For example, a Malawian judge stated: 
The legal notion of residence is distinct from that found in the dictionary and is con-
stituted by the fact of such physical presence in a place as is not fleeting or transitory. 
Any period of physical presence however short may constitute residence if it is shown 
that the presence is not transitory; if the period has just began, this will be a question 
of intention of the party. There is even no need for one to own property in a place in 
order for him to be capable of residing there. 
In re CJ (A Female Infant) (Adoption Appeal No. 28 of 2009), [2009] MWSC 1, 16 (Malawi) (em-
phasis added), available at http://www.malawilii.org/mw/judgment/supreme-court-appeal/ 
2009/1. 
 BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 27 
270 
intercountry adoption results in permanent deprivations of the bio-
logical family environment, permanent change in the child’s ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic and sometimes religious settling, the process must 
be circumscribed by sufficient safeguards and standards.”249 But Jus-
tice Nyirenda had to rely almost entirely on reports from abroad re-
garding the suitability of the prospective adoptive parent in at least 
one case. He noted: 
Since my interim order I have received two further reports by the 
Guardian Ad-Litem who has personally visited the petitioners in 
the United Kingdom where the infant now lives with them. The re-
ports are complemented by several independent reports of a social 
welfare agency in the United Kingdom. I have meticulously read 
through all the reports. They are very searching and comprehensive 
reports about the home and circumstances of the petitioners and 
more importantly about the development of the infant. In all the 
reports, the conclusion is that the infant’s development is excellent 
and is assured, physically and mentally. I have no reason to fault any 
of the reports.250 
The notion of post-adoption follow-up is embodied in Article 
24(f) of the African Charter, which provides that State Parties shall 
“establish a machinery to monitor the well-being of the adopted 
child.”251 This appears to be an improvement on the Hague Conven-
tion, which provides that receiving states can volunteer to provide re-
plies to sending states regarding the post-adoption situation, but are 
not obligated to do so.252 
One solution to the difficulties of intercountry adoptions is to 
impose reporting conditions. For these reporting conditions to oper-
ate as they should, states need to adopt bilateral agreements that, 
among other things, provide for reporting conditions. However, 
these conditions should not be prejudicial to the adoption process. 
For example, the American adoptive parents in In re Adelynn Naomi 
Luckey and Janae Martha-Ann Luckey253 were directed to submit ‘pro-
gress reports for the first five years, after which the court would make 
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a review.254 The adoptive parents subsequently petitioned the court, 
stating that U.S. authorities had rejected the children’s application 
for U.S. citizenship because the original adoption order wasn’t con-
sidered final due to this reporting provision’.255 In the best interest of 
the children, the Uganda courts felt compelled to order that the “re-
quirement for 5 years be reduced to 3 years and is hereby determined 
to have been fulfilled.”256 
The African Charter establishes a regional mechanism, namely 
the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (ACRWC),257 charged with monitoring and supervising im-
plementation of the charter. The ACRWC receives State reports and 
makes concluding remarks. Some of those remarks have dealt with 
intercountry adoptions. For example, when Uganda reported to the 
ACRWC in 2010, the ACRWC noted: “Uganda was also currently in 
the process of ratifying the Hague Convention to ensure the effective 
monitoring of children adopted outside the country.”258 This indi-
cates its concern for monitoring the post-adoption phase. But very 
little can be gathered from such brief and rare remarks regarding 
ACRWC’s position on intercountry adoption. Still, while ACRWC 
has supported the Hague Convention,259 a delegate to the ACRWC 
suggested that its main premise appears to be that “[i]n-Country 
Adoption, Foster Care or other alternative care options are the an-
swer to the problem of children that are deprived of their family en-
vironment in Africa.”260 
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Beyond this, ACRWC has done very little to elaborate on and 
clarify standards and solutions regarding intercountry adoptions in 
Africa, or to urge African countries to adopt better regulatory frame-
works.261 The Committee could offer more guidance by developing a 
general comment on Article 24 of the African Children’s Charter. 
The African Charter provides that every State party shall “pro-
mote, where appropriate, the objectives of [Article 24] by concluding 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements or agreements, and endeavor, 
within this framework to ensure that the placement of the child in 
another country is carried out by competent authorities or or-
gans.”262 In the wake of the incident with the returned Russian boy263 
there was talk of trying to conclude a bilateral agreement between 
Russia and the United States that would ensure abuses are avoided.264 
African countries should also be able to pursue these bilateral agree-
ments. As the South African Constitutional Court noted, “without 
bilateral agreements . . . there could not be effective post-adoption 
monitoring in respect of intercountry adoptions.”265 South Africa, in 
fact, requires a post-adoption report, which is written by the child 
protection organization of the Receiving State.266 Additionally, South 
Africa carries out country visits where possible to ensure post-
adoption placements.267 
IV. Analysis of Select African Countries’ Legal Regimes 
A majority of African countries provide in their legislation for the 
best interest of the child principle, and some of them specifically pro-
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vide for intercountry adoption.268 But some of these regulatory re-
gimes are simply not up to the mark as, save for a few,269 the majority 
of African countries do not even provide an explicit and comprehen-
sive definition of adoptability in their laws. And some countries’ 
regulatory frameworks remain prohibitively restrictive. Faced with 
situations in which the best interests of adoptable children are at 
stake, Courts have routinely circumvented even the few existing 
regulatory schemes,270 especially residency requirements. 271 
Beyond this, however, a review of the legislation of several Afri-
can countries demonstrates that there is no consistent legislation 
across the continent with regard to intercountry adoptions. One “ma-
jor impediment to intercountry adoption is often the conflict be-
tween the legislative requirements in the sending and receiving 
states.”272 One way to avoid this is to pursue common international 
 
 268. See, e.g., Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
Dec. 8, 1994, art. 36(2); Child Right Act, 2007, § 116(1) (Sierra Leone); Code of the Family, 
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Policy Forum, supra note 9. 
 272. Eade, supra note 120, at 383. 
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standards. However, many African countries are hesitant to join the 
Hague Convention partly because structures for implementing its 
proposals are not yet in place. Thus, out of fifty-three African coun-
tries, only thirteen are contracting parties to the Hague Conven-
tion—Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Guinea, Kenya, Madagas-
car, Mali, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, and 
Togo273—and are trying to bring their laws into conformity with the 
Hague Convention’s resolutions.274 Significantly, this list does not 
include at least eight of the top twelve sending African countries.275 
To make up for this, Ethiopia, the topmost sending country, tried to 
put in place “various checks to ensure that the adoptive families are 
thoroughly vetted. This can include visits to children in their new 
homes abroad.”276 But this is at best tentative and ad hoc. Becoming 
parties to the Hague Convention would increase the legal responsi-
bility of sending countries and bring on board all of the benefits dis-
cussed earlier. For example, the Hague Convention assigns responsi-
bility for ensuring proper consent to the adoption to the country of 
origin.277 To this end, it requires that “such persons, institutions and 
authorities have given their consent freely, in the required legal form, 
and expressed or evidenced in writing.”278 
 
 273. See African Child Policy Forum, supra note 9, at iii; Status Table: Convention of 29 
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Perhaps the reluctance of African States can be traced to their 
aversion to intercountry adoption generally, culturally preferring the 
extended family model to the nuclear model as their framework for 
responding to situations that lead to the placing (and raising of) a 
child with non-birth parents.279 
But the extended family system is not exactly what it was in the 
past as it has increasingly diminished in significance as more and 
more Africans move to urban centers.280 Yet even if this system was 
still a vibrant and effective option, it would still be overwhelmed by 
“wars and other crises [that] have created huge numbers of children 
for whom such family care is unavailable.”281 
Because only a few African countries are parties to the Hague 
Convention, the international protective guarantees embodied in this 
instrument will not be binding on those countries. One of the objec-
tives of the Hague Convention is to establish safeguards to ensure 
that intercountry adoption takes place in the best interests of the 
child.282 It is in the best interests of adoptable African children that 
their States of origin are parties to the Hague Convention; after all, 
there is an assumption that states who are signatories guarantee to 
prospective adoptive parents that they follow established standards. 
For example, one commentator advocates “that the United States 
permit international adoptions exclusively from countries that have 
approved the Hague Adoption Convention because that process en-
sures the parties involved will follow the maximum legal safeguards 
currently available.”283 For example, the 2003 statistics show that 
there were a total of 188 children adopted into Hague States.284 But 
 
 279. Martin, supra note 45, at 198. 
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adoption into non-Hague States in the same year only numbered at 
twenty-five.285 Apart from a few African countries,286 most countries’ 
legislation regarding intercountry adoption is simply outdated. 
Sometimes intercountry adoption is simply “prohibited, at least in 
law, or - as was the case in Liberia, and is still the case in Cameroon - 
there are no arrangements to regulate and monitor the practice ade-
quately.”287 
A. South Africa 
In 2008, for example, seventeen children were adopted from 
South Africa.288 But South Africa had already become a party to the 
Hague Convention, in 2005. To domesticate the Hague Convention, 
South Africa enacted the Children’s Act of 2005. An earlier statute, 
the Child Care Act of 1983, did not allow intercountry adoption un-
less one of the adoptive parents was a South African citizen, or had 
other residential qualifications and had applied for naturalization. But 
the inception of a new government in May 1994 and the passage of 
the new Constitution, along with a specific Constitutional Court de-
cision in 2000, led to “drastic changes” regarding intercountry adop-
tions in South Africa.289 
In terms of the Children’s Act, any child may be adopted if: “The 
child is an orphan and has no guardian or caregiver who is willing to 
adopt the child; the whereabouts of the child’s parent or guardian 
cannot be established; the child has been abandoned; the child’s par-
ent or guardian has abused or deliberately neglected the child, or has 
allowed the child to be abused or deliberately neglected; or the child 
is in need of a permanent alternative placement.”290 In the assess-
 
tistics 2001-2003, http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/adostats_za.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2013) (sta-
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ment, “an adoption social worker may take the cultural and commu-
nity diversity of the adoptable child and prospective adoptive parent 
into consideration.”291 Incidentally, a person’s financial status may 
not preclude them from adopting a child, however, it is important 
that prospective adoptive parents are able to provide for the adopted 
child.292 Chapter 16 of Children’s Act provides for the regulation of 
intercountry adoptions. It reads: “The purposes of this Chapter are—
(a) to give effect to the Hague Convention on Inter-country Adop-
tion; (b) to provide for the recognition of certain foreign adoptions; 
(c) to find fit and proper adoptive parents for an adoptable child; and 
(d) generally to regulate inter-country adoptions.”293 
“From a South African perspective, one of the most important 
provisions of the [Hague] Adoption Convention is to be found in [Ar-
ticle] 4(b), which stipulates that intercountry adoptions shall only 
take place after possibilities for intracountry placement of the child 
[have] been given due consideration.”294 Accordingly, the South Afri-
can Children’s Act places emphasis on the raising of South African 
children in the context of South African cultural traditions, even as it 
specifically prohibits some of the most egregious customary law prac-
tices and provides that “[e]very child has the right not to be subjected 
to social, cultural and religious practices which are detrimental to his 
or her well-being.”295 At the same time, the South African legislature 
included the provision that “[t]he ordinary law of the Republic [of 
South Africa] applies to an adoption to which the Convention applies 
but, where there is a conflict between the ordinary law of the Repub-
lic and the Convention, the Convention prevails.”296 
A high-profile intercountry-adoption case that predates the Chil-
dren’s Act of 2005 is Minister for Welfare and Population Development 
v. Fitzpatrick.297 In this case, “respondents applied to the Cape of 
Good Hope High Court for an order declaring section 18(4)(f)” of 
 
DownloadFileAction?id=67892 (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (internal numbering omitted). 
 291. Id. § 231(3). 
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the existing Child Care Act of South Africa “to be inconsistent with 
the Constitution and therefore invalid,” because it “absolutely pro-
scribe[d] the adoption of a child born of a South African citizen by a 
non-citizen or by a person who ha[d] the necessary residential quali-
fications for the grant of South African citizenship but ha[d] not ap-
plied for a certificate of naturalisation.”298 The Constitutional Court 
of South Africa held as follows:  
 The provisions of section 18(4)(f) are too blunt and all-
embracing to the extent that they provide that under no circum-
stances may a child born to a South African citizen be adopted by 
non-South African citizens. To that extent they do not give para-
mountcy to the best interests of children and are inconsistent with 
the provisions of section 28(2) of the Constitution and hence inva-
lid.299  
This case correctly prioritized the best-interests principle over the 
subsidiarity principle. South Africa also hosted a conference, which 
confirmed this same prioritization: 
Subsidiarity means that a child should be raised by his or her birth 
family or extended family (kinship group) whenever possible. If that 
is not possible or practical, other forms of permanent family care in 
the country of origin should be considered. Only after full and 
proper consideration has been given to national solutions should in-
tercountry adoption be considered, and then only if it is in the 
child’s best interest. The subsidiarity principle should not be ap-
plied inflexibly and at the expense of the child’s best interests.300 
B. Malawi 
Besides South Africa, there are very few African countries to look 
to for best practices regarding intercountry adoptions. Malawi is an 
example of a country that is not yet a signatory to the Hague Con-
vention and has thus had to deal with the complexities of intercoun-
try adoption using a relatively elementary legal framework. The fact 
 
 298. Id. at paras. 1–2. 
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 300. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Pretoria, S. Afr., Feb. 22–25, 2010, 
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that Malawi is not yet a signatory may further explain why in 2008 
only two adoptions to the United States were reported.301 
Malawi’s Adoption of Children Act is the principal legislation 
governing matters of adoption. This statute was originally enacted in 
1949 as the Adoption of Children Ordinance, based on an old Eng-
lish statute of 1926.302 Section 3 of this statute provides for re-
strictions on making the adoption orders, and it expressly provides 
that an adoption order should not be made except with the consent of 
the parent or guardian.303 Section 3(5) also states that an “order shall 
not be made in favour of any applicant who is not resident in Malawi 
or in respect of any infant who is not so resident.”304 Unsurprisingly, 
section 3(5) of the Adoption of Children Act has given rise to differ-
ent interpretations by the Malawi Supreme Court when trying to ac-
commodate intercountry adoptions. Strictly interpreted, Malawi’s 
Adoption of Children Act is simply outdated and out of line with re-
cent developments such as those embodied in the Hague Convention. 
Because the regulatory framework is so insufficient, i.e., it lacks clear 
guidelines, hapless judges are left to their own resources to try to do 
the best they can to protect the interests of the child. Sometimes 
judges get it right and sometimes they do not. An exchange between 
Malawi’s Chief Justice Munlo and a judge in a lower court evidence 
this lack of clarity. The judge from the lower court stated: 
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Ms Madonna may not be the only international person interested in 
adopting the so-called poor children of Malawi. By removing the 
very safeguard that is supposed to protect our children the courts by 
their pronouncements could actually facilitate trafficking of chil-
dren by some unscrupulous individuals who would take advantage 
of the weakness of the law of the land. It is necessary that we look 
beyond a particular petitioner, and may be [sic] even a particular 
benefactor but go beyond them, and consider the consequences of 
opening the doors too wide. Anyone could come to Malawi and 
quickly arrange for an adoption that might have grave consequences 
on the very children that the law seeks to protect.305 
But Chief Justice Munlo, without addressing the essential criti-
cism of the inadequacy of the law, dismissed the lower-court judge’s 
remark. 
With the greatest deference to the Judge in the court below we 
think that she fell in error by looking beyond the particular peti-
tioner and the particular benefactor that were before the court and 
basing her decision on some imaginary unscrupulous individuals al-
legedly involving themselves in child trafficking. These unscrupu-
lous individuals were not before the court. They have not applied 
for an adoption order. The Appellant has. The Judge also fell into 
grave error in deciding to protect some imaginary children who 
were not parties to these proceedings thereby ignoring the particu-
lar infant CJ who was before the court. The court ought to have 
based its decision on the particular appellant and the particular in-
fant that were before the court.306 
In light of the lack of clarity and explicitness of Malawi’s inter-
country adoption legislation, the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) could only say that, with regard to the Madonna-Banda 
adoption case, “it did not have adequate information to comment on 
the legality of the adoption.”307 In the aftermath of the Madonna-
Banda case, there was an attempt to overhaul adoption laws in Mala-
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wi as quickly as possible because “the adoption laws in Malawi . . . are 
not in agreement with international adoption laws.”308 
When the domestic legal framework is not well elaborated and 
facilitative enough, judges might end up circumventing some of its 
provisions. In Malawi, this is illustrated in the court’s maneuvers to 
prevent giving full effect to the country’s strict residential require-
ment. In In re TM (A Female Infant), a case decided after In re David 
Banda, the court stated: 
It is clear that courts are enjoined to look at several factors includ-
ing physical presence in a country, duration thereof, motive for 
coming to the country; whether one came by chance or by design 
and intention to remain there for sometime [sic]. No one factor 
should take prominence over the  others. In this respect therefore, 
whether or not one is resident in this country will be dependent on 
the evidence and the facts of each particular case. I will, likewise, 
adopt this approach in the present case.309 
The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal on appeal in In re CJ (A 
Female Infant)310 with respect to “residence,” having considered a lot 
of case law on the matter, decided to define “residence” on the appli-
cant’s motive to be present in the country, i.e., whether it was by 
chance or design. Malawi’s judges, trying to find a way to grant adop-
tions, will sometimes simply ignore or downplay the significance of 
the residence requirement.311 Thus, although Madonna did not stay 
in Malawi for what would normally be considered a reasonable length 
of time, Chief Justice Munlo noted that the residence requirement “is 
not the only factor” in the age of “[g]lobalisation and the global vil-
lage” and that “[i]t is no longer tied to the notion of permanence as a 
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deciding factor.”312 He then quoted a 2006 opinion by Judge 
Nyirenda. 
The requirement as to residence, in my view is also intended to en-
able the system in Malawi to verify the standing and disposition of 
the applicants with some degree of certainty. But all these consider-
ations in my judgment are intended to establish that the infant child 
will be in safe and secure hands.313 
Chief Justice Munlo went on to say: 
The legal notion of residence is distinct from that found in the dic-
tionary and is constituted by the fact of such physical presence in a 
place as is not fleeting or transitory. Any period of physical presence 
however short may constitute residence if it is shown that the pres-
ence is not transitory; if the period has just began, this will be a 
question of intention of the party. There is even no need for one to 
own property in a place in order for him to be capable of residing 
there.314 
Chief Justice Munlo went on to consider Madonna’s futuristic 
good intentions as sufficient to satisfy the residence requirement. 
She [Madonna] specifically came here for the purpose of this appli-
cation for adoption. And on that day she had already adopted an-
other infant known as David Banda from Malawi. The Appellant 
has plans to travel to Malawi frequently with her adopted children 
in order to instill in them a cultural pride and knowledge of their 
country of origin. . . . It is clear from this evidence that the Appel-
lant in this case is not a mere sojourner in this country but has a 
targeted long term presence aimed at ameliorating the lives of more 
disadvantaged children in Malawi. . . . In our view it is clear that the 
evidence on the court record establishes that the Applicant was at 
the time of this application resident in Malawi. She was not in the 
country by chance or as a mere sojourner.315 
Interpreting this residence requirement in In re David Banda (A 
Male Infant), in which Guy Stuart Ritchie and Madonna Louise 
Ritchie jointly presented a petition for the adoption of an infant, Da-
vid Banda, the judge asked whether “residence” is an end in itself in 
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the context it is used, especially bearing in mind that the court was 
dealing with welfare of children, or merely a means to an end.316 The 
judge argued that the best interests of the infant should override the 
requirement of residence, stating, “I am of the clear judgment that 
the requirement as to residence, be it important, is merely a means to 
an end. I also have no doubt in my mind that the ‘end’ is the best in-
terest of the child.”317 “In response to the increased applications for 
international adoptions, the Chief Justice of Malawi on July 1, 2009, 
issued Practice Direction No. 3 of 2009.”318 But these are tentative 
and provisional measures, at best. 
The jurisprudence of Malawi demonstrates a recurring concern 
across many African countries: whether courts grant intercountry 
adoption petitions because of the promise of a materially better fu-
ture for the adoptable child rather than their best interest. In In re CJ 
(A Female Infant), the Madonna-Banda case, the mother of female in-
fant CJ had died a few days after giving birth.319 The father of infant 
CJ was not known. After the death of her mother, infant CJ was 
transferred to her maternal grandmother to raise her. (It is not un-
common for this to happen to children in Malawi, even if their par-
ents are still alive.) At the time Madonna tried to adopt infant CJ, the 
child was living in an orphanage. According to Justice Munlo, the or-
phanage was helping the grandmother and her extended family raise 
the infant CJ because of their “hopeless [economic] situation.”320  
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C. Uganda 
Not only is Uganda not a party to the Hague Convention, its 
laws on intercountry adoption have not been sufficiently elaborated 
to reflect international standards. Like in Malawi, this leaves judges 
in Uganda in a situation where they are forced to circumvent the 
strict letter of the law. For example, the Children Act of Uganda pro-
vides that “[a] person who is not a citizen of Uganda may in excep-
tional circumstances adopt a Ugandan child, if he or she . . . has 
stayed in Uganda for at least three years.”321 Previously, Ugandan 
courts were less inclined to grant intercountry adoption unless the 
residential requirement was strictly fulfilled. That has changed for 
the most part, although the law itself remains prohibitively restric-
tive. But sometimes judges simply lament that their hands are tied. In 
In re Harry John Shilling (An Infant), Justice Kireju had this to say 
about a strict prior law: 
The wording of the section is mandatory; no discretion is left to the 
court. Generally the law relating to adoption of children is very 
strict, and it is regrettable that this law has not been looked at since 
1964 and some of the previsions are not up-to-date with the chang-
es which have taken place in our society. However, until the law is 
amended, my hands are tied. In the result, I cannot grant an adop-
tion order as the petitioners are not resident in Uganda.322 
However, under the more enabling intercountry adoption law, 
the courts have been more accommodating by not only expanding the 
scope of residential requirements, but also by taking economic cir-
cumstances into account. To do this, courts tend to gloss over or ig-
nore the underlying purpose of the residence requirement. They are 
assisted in this by the impression of the statute. For example, “resi-
dence” is not defined in the Children Act of Uganda. This has al-
lowed the courts to adopt an expansive and liberal interpretation,323 
although they appear at times uncomfortable in doing this. As Justice 
Tsekooko of the Uganda Supreme Court noted, “[T]hese applica-
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tions would on moral grounds evoke sympathy and liberal approach 
in interpreting Section 4(5) but lam [sic] aware that Courts apply the 
law as it is and not morality.”324 Justice Tsekooko justified the liberal 
interpretation as follows: 
In my view the absence of the expressions “normally resident” or 
“ordinarily resident” or indeed “permanently resident” or “habitual-
ly resident” to S.4 of the Act opens construction of the word “Resi-
dent” to include “constructive residence.” . . . I am satisfied that the 
object of the Act is to promote the welfare of the Infant rather than 
to make it hard for prospective adopters to get Adoption Orders. . 
. . The provisions of the Act should be interpreted liberally so as to 
enhance the benefit and protection of infants to be adopted and 
thereby give effect to the intention of the legislature.325 
In In re Sharon Asige (An Infant),326 the court was content with 
the fact that “[t]he child knows the petitioners’ family well and has 
been communicating with them regularly.” In this case, the petition-
ers were American citizens and they sought to adopt a seven-year-old 
Ugandan child who had lost both of her parents when she was 
younger and who, at the time of the adoption proceedings, was being 
raised by her paternal uncle. Economic considerations featured 
prominently in the court’s decision. The petitioners had been resi-
dent in Uganda for only 26 months. The court noted: “The first ap-
plicant is a social worker who is self employed as a licensed contrac-
tor with a monthly income of U$ 4,300 [sic]. The second petitioner is 
a graduate at Michigan with a High School Diploma and has enjoyed 
being a home maker for several years.”327 The Court concluded that: 
[T]hough they have not been resident in Uganda for 3 years, they 
have nevertheless shown that they are able to provide the child with 
a home where she has an opportunity to grow up and realize her full 
potential in life and that this is a situation where the court can exer-
cise its discretion to grant the order sought.328 
 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. In re Sharon Asige (An Infant) (Adoption Cause No. 144 of 2009) (2009) UGHC 84 
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 327. Id. 
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The Sharon Asige case was by no means exceptional or atypical. 
In In re Children Act Cap 50 and In re Paula Robertson and Cynthia June 
Robertson, an Infant,329 the court held that the provisions in section 46 
of the Children Act (Uganda), including those regarding residence, 
are not mandatory because the welfare principle in section 3 of the 
Children Act is paramount. In In re J.N (an infant),330 where the 
adoption application had not been granted because of a lack of proof 
of residence, the Uganda Supreme Court allowed the appeal, and 
Chief Justice Odoki stated in his ruling that in adoption proceedings, 
as in matters relating to children, the guiding principle is the welfare 
of the child, and the appeal was granted. In In re Michael Benjamin Pi-
etsch and In re An Application for Adoption by Christopher John Pietsch 
and Sharon Pietsch,331 Justice Egonda Ntende held that although the 
petitioners have not been residents for all three years, the court could 
give a liberal interpretation of Section 46 of the Children Act while 
considering the circumstances of the case and that interests of the 
child were paramount. 
In the previously mentioned case332 the petitioners were Australi-
ans. The court noted while the petitioner had been with the child in 
Uganda for about one year and thereafter with the child in Australia, 
in its opinion the time spent with the child in Australia was counted 
towards the three-year requirement, noting that petitioners fostered 
this child for 35 months in total. The Court relied on the fact that 
the “petitioners come well recommended.” It was also argued that the 
“requirement for fostering the child for 36 months in Uganda is not 
mandatory.” 
In some cases, however, the Ugandan courts have expressed con-
cern for the risks inherent in intercountry adoptions and have been 
reluctant to grant adoptions where there is insufficient information, 
particularly with regard to criminal record of petitioners. For exam-
ple, in In re Atuhaire Ivan and Namutebi Deborah (both Infants) and In 
 
 329. Id. (citing In re Children Act Cap 50 and In re Paula Robertson and Cynthia June Robert-
son, an Infant, Adoption Cause No. 31/2004). 
 330. Id. (citing In re J.N (An Infant), Civil appeal No. 22/94, Uganda Supreme Court Civ-
il Appeal case). 
 331. In re Michael Benjamin Pietsch and In re an Application for an Adoption Order by Christo-
pher John Pietsch and Sharon Pietsch, Family Cause No. 102/08, 2008 UGHC 125 (Sept. 3, 2008) 
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re a Petition for Adoption by Bundy Andrew Michael and Westtley Laura 
Anne,333 Justice Egonda-Ntende rejected an adoption petition, noting 
that the petitioners had not produced a report or recommendation 
from the Probation and Social Welfare Officer from the United 
Kingdom as required under Section 46(1) (d) of the Children Act of 
Uganda. Neither had the petitioners produced a report in respect of 
their criminal record in the United Kingdom. But these are precisely 
the sort of confounding issues that could be avoided if Uganda was 
party to the Hague Convention. 
Uganda’s legal infrastructure remains lacking in responsiveness to 
the practical needs of adoption legislation. In response to Uganda’s 
report, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 
noted the rising number of applications for legal guardianship of 
children, and the reduced number of applications for adoption. It 
viewed such a trend as potentially aimed at circumventing the regula-
tions that apply to adoption.334 
D. Zambia 
Eight children were adopted from Zambia into the United States 
in 2008;335 that is not negligible. Yet Zambia is not a party to the 
Hague Convention. In fact, according to the Office of Children’s Is-
sues of the United States Department of State, a brief five-month 
suspension of foreign adoptions in Zambia occurred between De-
cember 2007 and May 2008, which could only be understood as evi-
dence of lack of a sufficient regulatory framework. Zambia’s Adop-
tion Act was enacted in 1958 and is simply out of line with 
developments embodied in the Hague Convention. Zambia is now in 
the process of reviewing its child welfare laws, including those per-
taining to adoption. As an example of Zambia’s restrictive laws, Sec-
tion 33(1)(a) and (b) of Zambia’s Adoption Act provides: 
 
 333. In re Atuhaire Ivan & Namutebi Deborah (both Infants) and In re a Petition for Adoption 
by Bundy Andrew Michael and Westtley Laura Anne Justice 2009 UGHC 96 (Mar. 25, 2009) 
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 334. UNRC, Concluding Observations of Committee on the Rights of the Child, Uganda ¶ 20, 
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/OPSC/UGA/CO/1 (2008). 
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The Commissioner may grant a licence in the prescribed form, and 
subject to such conditions and restrictions as he may think fit, au-
thorising the care and possession of an infant for whose adoption 
arrangements have been made to be transferred to a person resident 
abroad, but, subject to the provisions of this section, no such licence 
shall be granted unless the Commissioner . . . is satisfied that the 
application is made by or with the consent of every person or body 
of persons who is a parent or guardian of the infant in question, or 
who has the actual custody of the infant, or who is liable to contrib-
ute to the support of the infant; and . . . is satisfied by the report of 
a Zambian consular officer, or any other person who appears to the 
Commissioner to be trustworthy, that the person to whom the care 
and possession of the infant is proposed to be transferred is a suita-
ble person to be trusted therewith, and that the transfer is likely to 
be for the welfare of the infant, due consideration being for this 
purpose given to the wishes of the infant, having regard to the age 
and understanding of the infant. 
In addition, Zambia does have the following requirement for pro-
spective adoptive parents that is obviously geared towards providing 
some insurance for the best interest of the child: prospective adoptive 
parents must reside in Zambia for at least 12 months in order to 
adopt a Zambian child. But in practice this residency requirement 
may be reduced to three months to correspond to the typical foster-
ing period.336 
E. Ethiopia 
Ethiopia tops Africa in terms of intercountry adoptions.337 Out of 
a projected population of 82.5 million in 2011, Ethiopia had an esti-
mated 6 million orphan and vulnerable children.338 
 
 336. See Country Specific Information for Zambia, U.S. Dep’t of State: Bureau of 
Consular Affairs, 
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?country-
select=zambia (last updated July 2012); Intercountry Adoption, Zambia, Passports USA (Feb. 
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 337. African Child Policy Forum, Intercountry Adoption: An African Perspec-
tive (2012), available at http://www.africanchildforum.org/ipc/documents/Intercountr 
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 338. Yayesh Tesfahuney, Policies, Practices and Challenges in Inter-country Adoption: Ethio-
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Americans adopted 1725 Ethiopian children in the twelve-month 
period ending Sept. 30, 2008, which was about 70 percent of all U.S. 
adoptions from Africa.339 “The year before, 1,255 Ethiopian children 
were adopted by Americans.”340 
While Ethiopia has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, it has not ratified the more comprehensive, and by all counts 
the more significant, Hague Convention.341 Notwithstanding, Ethio-
pia has put in place some domestic regulatory safeguards for inter-
country adoptions and is also planning to approve a comprehensive 
child policy.342 Article 36(5) of Ethiopia’s constitution provides that 
the state shall accord special protection to orphans and shall encour-
age the establishment of institutions that ensure and promote their 
adoption and advance their welfare and education.343 But it is im-
portant to note that institutional care is not much promoted. There 
are more than 100 child-care institutions, but it is estimated that 
there are only 7000 children in institutional care centers.344 
The Revised Family Code of Ethiopia dedicates Chapter 10 to 
the adoption process. This Code provides, inter alia, that “the court, 
before approving the agreement of adoption, shall take the following 
into consideration: . . . where the adopter is a foreigner, the absence 
of access to raise the child in Ethiopia.” 345 This clearly upholds the 
subsidiarity principle. Additionally, this Code provides that “[w]here 
the adopter is a foreigner, the court may not approve the adoption 
unless an authority empowered to follow the wellbeing of children, 
after collecting and analyzing relevant information about the person-
 
 339. Celean Jacobson, Madonna’s African Adoptions Part of Growing Trend, Huffington 
Post (April 1, 2009, 9:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/01/madonnas-african-
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 341. Status Table: Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, Hague Convention on Private International Law, 
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al, social and economic position of the adopter, gives its opinion that 
the agreement is beneficial to the child.”346 
Significantly, this Code urges the courts to “take special care in 
investigating the conditions provided in Sub-Art. (3)(e) of this Arti-
cle, where the adopter is a foreigner.”347 Sub-article (3)(e) of Article 
194 of this Code demands the “availability of information which will 
enable the court to know that the adopter will handle the adopted 
child as his own child and will not abuse him.” It is remarkable, how-
ever, that in spite of the existence of local adoptions, intercountry 
adoptions by far exceed local adoptions in Ethiopia, which gives rise 
to the suspicion that the courts may not be enforcing the subsidiarity 
principle as rigorously as would be expected.348 Additionally, these 
laws, as structured and applied, appear to be simply incapable of 
stopping intercountry adoption abuses in Ethiopia. For example, it 
has been reported that “[s]ome adoption agencies appear to be solic-
iting children directly from families,”349as well as “orphanages or ma-
ternity homes . . . [and that they] coerce women to relinquish their 
newborns.”350 Further, “adoptions have been shifting from ‘white’ to 
‘gray’—that is, from a well-regulated humanitarian effort dedicated 
to children’s welfare, to a business that is taking children away from 
their families in order to gain profits from Western adoption fees.”351 
Ethiopia simply hasn’t managed its intercountry adoption process as 
efficiently as it should, evidenced by the absence of a comprehensive 
data management system.352 
F. Nigeria 
Under the Child’s Rights Act of 2003, an adoption order cannot 
be made in respect of a child unless “the applicant is a citizen or, in 
the case of a joint application, both applicants are citizens of Nige-
 
 346. Id. at art. 193(1). 
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ria.”353 But pursuant to the Constitution of Nigeria, this statute only 
applies to the city of Abuja.354 Not all the states of the Federation 
have passed this statute, and therefore they are not bound to comply 
with its provisions.355 Under the Nigerian Constitution, the rights 
and welfare of children, in general, are matters within the legislative 
competence of individual States.356 Thus, the Child’s Rights laws of 
Lagos State, Anambra State, and Oyo State have provisions for per-
sons who are not citizens of Nigeria to adopt children from those 
States. In addition, the Lagos State law allows for an out-of-state 
adoption.357 There is a clear need for consistency and uniformity in 
Nigerian law with regard to intercountry adoptions. 
V. Recommendations 
Based on the subsidiarity principle, courts in African countries 
should give priority to domestic adoptions. It is important to note 
that even in countries where the extended family system is still vi-
brant, intercountry adoptions are taking place. There is undeniably a 
monetary element to it, and it is vital that African governments rein 
in this aspect of intercountry adoptions because it makes them ripe 
for corruption. At a meeting hosted by the Government of South Af-
rica and the Hague Conference on Private International Law held in 
February 2010 in Pretoria, it was observed that a main issue is “the 
importance for African countries to be prepared to deal with the 
pressures to release more children for adoption abroad . . . It is also 
essential for countries to co-operate in combating the abuses, includ-
ing profiteering, which sometimes arise in intercountry adoption.”358 
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For example, while it is “common in Ethiopia for families to in-
corporate children of relatives into their own households, formal and 
legal adoptions remain the preserve of foreigners,” it is remarkable 
that it “costs up to $25,000 to adopt a child to take abroad.”359 By 
contrast, in one case it cost roughly $300 for an in-country adop-
tion.”360 In an interview for BBC, an independent consultant who 
works with women’s affairs organizations in Ethiopia said, “In Ethio-
pia adoption has become far too lucrative a business where children’s 
interests seem secondary.”361 African nations need to ensure they 
have procedure for closely tracking the use of adoption fees that 
should be specifically itemized and should create centralized adoption 
authorities. 
It is important that African countries develop the necessary infra-
structure to handle intercountry adoptions. This is easier said than 
done. For example, “many African countries lack the necessary hu-
man and financial resources to even monitor and ensure that consent 
[to intercountry adoption] is obtained in a free and informed man-
ner. . . “362 African governments do not even have registries to pro-
vide sufficient information on the adoptable children. “Often adop-
tive parents do not know the true background of the youngster.”363 
But African governments can at least put in place the necessary regu-
lations and basic infrastructure to ensure that there is traceable evi-
dence that meaningful consent to adoption was given. In Kenya, con-
sent must be given through the correct authority, and consents for 
adoption must be written.364 In South Africa, while the relevant au-
thorities in both the sending and receiving countries must consent to 
adoption, provision is made for the South African Authority to with-
draw its consent within 140 days of the date of consent.365 
The importance of African countries joining more comprehen-
sive international intercountry treaties, such as the Hague Conven-
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tion, cannot be overstated. African countries worry that adopted chil-
dren “end up as sex slaves and whatever else they could be used for 
around the world,”366 and yet can do very little follow-up. In re-
sponse, some African countries have extremely restrictive legislations 
in place, which Courts nevertheless routinely circumvent, and other 
African countries have gone to the extreme of outlawing intercountry 
adoptions altogether. The only way to have more assurance is to join 
international treaties that were specifically adopted to respond to 
such concerns. Some prominent receiving countries, like the United 
States, are not party to international treaties like the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and the African Charter, but they are parties 
to the Hague Convention. So, it is important that African countries 
become parties to as many international treaties as possible, particu-
larly those in which most receiving states participate. Additionally, 
this step would promote common and uniform standards among Af-
rican States and help prevent the equivalent of forum shopping.367 
The disparate and divergent national standards across the continent 
can be demonstrated by the Madonna and Angelina Jolie adoptions 
from Malawi and Ethiopia, respectively. An Ethiopian adoption can 
take only two days to finalize if the potential adoptive parent’s pa-
perwork, that is, paperwork with the adoptive parent’s “Competent 
Authority,” (e.g., the U.S State Department) is in order.368 Due to 
Ethiopia’s extremely high number of orphans, Ethiopia has taken 
great strides to make intercountry adoption easier—even as the adop-
tive parents must provide a post-placement report after three months, 
again at the six-month mark, and once again on the one-year anniver-
sary of the adoption. Then yearly reports must be provided until the 
child reaches the age of eighteen.369 By contrast, Madonna spent al-
most a year attempting to adopt David Banda from Malawi. “She was 
granted only temporary custody of [David Banda], and child welfare 
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was charged to regularly monitor and assess the family at their resi-
dence in England over a period of eighteen months.”370 
It may very well be that the more stringent standards within Ma-
lawi governing adoption contribute to the lower number of adoptions 
in that country,371 which could also mean that the divergent stand-
ards between Ethiopia and Malawi have not gone unnoticed by pro-
spective adoptive parents. 
It is important that more stringent international standards are es-
tablished, while at the same time not discouraging intercountry adop-
tions. African countries are looking for increased assurances that in-
tercountry adoptions are as safe as they can possibly be. The Hague 
Convention establishes the conditions in Article 4 that have to be 
complied with in all cases, no matter what the applicable law may 
provide.372 Further, it overly defers to national standards by provid-
ing that the State of origin and the receiving State shall collaborate 
from the very beginning. As permitted by Article 24, either State may 
refuse the agreement for the adoption to continue based on public 
policy grounds.373 However, the Hague Convention offers no expla-
nation as to when an adoption manifestly contravenes a State’s public 
policy, which appears to grant national courts the power to invalidate 
adoptions on this basis.374 The Hague Convention was “structured as 
an instrument of co-operation,”375 but it could certainly do more 
than this. This deference is also noted with regard to the question as 
to how to determine when an “internal” or “national” adoption is not 
possible, which was not discussed during the negotiations. Conse-
quently, the State of origin is not responsible for the observance of 
the subsidiarity principle sanctioned by the Hague Convention.376 
Because the existing Hague Convention sets only “minimum 
standards and procedures for adoptions,”377 emphasis should be put 
on elaborating national legislation. Domestic legislation regarding 
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intercountry adoption should be premised primarily on the idea of 
intercountry adoptions as a “last resort.” This accords well with Afri-
can traditions such as “it takes a village, to raise a child,” and the idea 
of the extended family participating in raising the child, both of 
which hold particular resonance.378 For example, in South Africa, the 
Children’s Act requires two criteria before an intercountry adoption 
takes place. First, the name of the child should have been placed in 
the register for Adoptable Children and Prospective Adoptive Par-
ents for at least 60 days.379 Second, it should be evident that “no fit 
and proper adoptive parent for the child”380 is available locally. In 
crafting reforms for intercountry adoptions in Africa, a good place to 
look for model rules is the Draft Guidelines for Action on Intercoun-
try Adoption of Children in Africa.381 
It is important that international law regarding intercountry 
adoption does not emphasize permanent legal severance of ties be-
tween adoptable children and their African roots.382 After all, it is ar-
gued that it is legal fiction to suggest that there would be no continu-
ing relationship between adopted child and birth families. The 
contemporary experience of adoption indicates that even adopted in-
dividuals who have excellent relationships with their adoptive families 
yearn to know, or at least know about, their birth families. This leads 
to reunions attempted and arranged across the barriers of oceans, cul-
tures, and language.383 Some observers have also pointed to the fact 
that adoptees “speak eloquently and with great insight about their 
struggles with their sense of loss.”384 They also maintain that: 
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[T]he degree of identity integration among international adoptees 
must be balanced against the growing body of work by international 
adoptees, much of which chronicles alienation both from birth and 
adoptive cultures, significant identity and role confusion, and pro-
found degrees of depression and anger over the loss of identity, 
family and heritage.385 
African countries also ought to pursue the possibility of conclud-
ing cooperation agreements with receiving States, an option that is 
available under the International Convention on the Rights of the 
Child386 and the African Charter.387 Additionally, like the Europe-
an388 and Inter-American systems,389 African countries should estab-
lish a regional treaty concerning intercountry adoptions to be able to 
address issues relating to adoptions among African countries. Later, it 
could then allow non-African countries to become parties to it. The 
African Court of Human Rights and Justice should also be empow-
ered to adjudicate cases regarding intercountry adoption to the extent 
State parties are involved. 
With regard to birthparents, if one or both are still alive, it is im-
portant to make sure that they are truly relinquishing their rights as 
parents in order to ensure that there is no misunderstanding as to 
what it would mean to have their child adopted into another coun-
try.390 Payments391 to birth parents do sometimes occur, whether it is 
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termed “assistance,” pre- or post-relinquishment.392 However, it is 
also the case that vulnerable birth parents are still open to coercion 
and forced consent. Yet, at least in the United States, no one is re-
sponsible for coercive acts because the in-country agent is not a su-
pervised provider.393 This only demonstrates that improper induce-
ment of consent by an in-country intermediary394 for the adoption of 
children is an act to be criminalized. National legislation should also 
“prohibit payments to foreign providers, birthparents, and others for 
the purposes of inducement; and ensure full disclosure of agency and 
foreign fees and children’s health backgrounds to prospective par-
ents.”395 Foreign countries should follow suit to avoid imposing un-
due restrictions on birthparents who knowingly and voluntarily sur-
render rights to a child. However, a situation where the birth parents 
are willing to surrender a child for adoption must be distinguished 
from a situation where it merely appears that the birth parents are 
knowingly relinquishing their rights.396 
VI. Conclusion 
Intercountry adoption remains a controversial practice. But, in an 
increasingly interconnected world, the international community has 
moved from a tepid to a warm embrace of the practice, as long as it is 
executed as a last resort and is properly regulated. Initially, African 
countries were reluctant to allow intercountry adoptions. They put in 
place virtually no legislation relating to international adoption, and 
refused to join international regimes, except for the more general 
ones like the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African 
Charter. But, more recently, intercountry adoptions have surged in 
 
tators or attorneys who act as intermediaries between U.S. adoption agencies and the 
foreign orphanages, in turn, compensate orphanage directors or child recruiters for 
each child referred. . . . In some sending countries, bribes are paid to government of-
ficials to produce false paperwork or to obtain approvals for adoption. 
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Africa. Unfortunately, African legal regimes and infrastructure are 
hopelessly unprepared to handle this development. It is therefore im-
portant that African countries put aside their reservations, join the 
Hague Convention regime, and update their domestic laws as soon as 
they can. 
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